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Taxing Buybacks
Daniel J. Hemelt & Gregg D. Polskytt
A recent rise in the volume of corporate share repurchases has
prompted calls for changes to the rules governing stock buybacks. These
calls for reform are animatedby concerns that buybacks enrich corporate
executives at the expense of productive investment. This emerging antibuyback movement includes prominentpoliticians as well as academics
andRepublicansas well as Democrats. The primaryfocus of buyback critics has been on securities-lawchangesto deterrepurchases, with onlypassing mention ofpotential tax-law solutions.
This Article critically examines the policy arguments against buybacks andarrivesat a mixed verdict. On the one hand, claims that buybacks
reduce corporateinvestment andinappropriatelyrewardexecutives turn
out to be poorly supported On the other hand, the Article identifieslegitimate tax-relatedconcerns about the rising buyback tide. Buybacks exacerbate two of the U.S. taxsystem'smostsevere flaws. The firstisthe "Mark
Zuckerbergproblem ": the effective nontaxationof firm founders on what
is essentiallylaborincome. The secondis what we call the "PanamaPapers
problem ": the use of U.S. capitalmarkets by investors in offshore tax havens to generate tax-free returns.
Our search for solutions to the Mark Zuckerberg andPanamaPapersproblems brings us back to a prescient1969 article by then- Yale Law
SchoolprofessorMarvin Chirelstein. The main innovation of Chirelstein's
article was to explain how buybacks could be taxed the same way as dividends at the shareholderlevel. Chirelstein'sprofferedjustificationfor his
proposalhas obsolesced in the succeeding five decades, but the proposal
nonethelessprovides a technically elegantframework for addressingtwo
of the modern-day U.S. tax system's majorills.
This Article evaluates Chirelstein'sproposaland updates it for the
twenty-first century. We outline the mechanics of the proposal, suggest a
range of tweaks, and show how adoption of the proposalwould substantially improve the US. capital-taxation regime. Along the way, we
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illustratethe benefits ofincrementalism both in taxpolicy and tax scholarship. Progress, we argue, often involves reviving the best ideas of yesteryearratherthan writing on a blank slate.
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Introduction
Stock buybacks announced by U.S. corporations hit an all-time high
in 2018, topping $1 trillion for the first time.' The pace of share repurchases

1.

See Matt Egan, CorporateAmerica Gives out a Record $1 Trillion in Stock Buybacks,

CNN (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:44 PM EST), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/17/investing/stock-buybackstrillion-dollars/index.html [https://perma.cc/N369-JKS5].
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slowed slightly in 2019, but buybacks that year remained the single biggest
source of demand for U.S. public equity.2 And although the onset of the
COVID-19 crisis put a hold on many stock-repurchase programs, 3 the
pause appears to be only temporary. 4 A number of high-profile firmsincluding Apple,5 Starbucks, 6 and Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway'-have continued buying back their own shares through the pandemic.
While buybacks often raise cheers from investors and analysts, record-breaking share repurchases also have become a cause of consternation
among politicians and policymakers who fear that stock buybacks pad the
pockets of corporate executives and divert funds from productive investment. Several former candidates for the Democratic Party's 2020

2.

See Share Buybacks to Slide 15% in 2019 and 5% Next Year, Says Goldman, CHIEF

INVESTMENT OFFICER (Dec.

18, 2019), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/share-buybacks-slide-15-

2019-5-next-year-says-goldman [https://perma.cc/ZD7K-ZE49].
3.
See Grace Maral Burnett, Analysis: S&P 500 Buyback Suspensions, Dividend Cuts
Raise Flags, BLOOMBERG L. (May 22, 2020, 6:29 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-s-p-500-buyback-suspensions-dividend-cuts-raise-flags

[https://perma.cc/4LV7-G9P9]. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act signed into law in March 2020 provides that firms receiving direct loans and loan guarantees
from the U.S. Treasury Department cannot repurchase shares for twelve months after the date
that the loan or loan guarantee is no longer outstanding. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,

§ 4003(c)(2)(E),

134 Star. 281, 471 (2020). The repurchase re-

striction does not apply to firms that received forgivable loans through the $669 billion Payroll
Protection Program (PPP). Dozens of public companies received PPP loans; many-though not
all-returned their loans under public pressure. See, e.g., Allison Levitsky, Publicly Traded Tesla
Rival Nio Among the LargestPPPLoan Recipients in Silicon Valley, NewData Shows, SILICON

VALLEY

Bus.

J.

(July

8,

2020,

7:19

AM

PDT),

https://www.bizjour-

nals.com/sanjose/news/2020/07/08/nio-ppp-loan-public-companies-silicon-valley.html

[https://perma.cc/CMP4-Q8SP?type=image]; Mark Niquette, Bailout List Includes Firms with
Trump Ties, Major Nonprofits, WASH. POST (July 7, 2020, 2:27 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/bailout-list-includes-firms-with-trump-ties-major-non-

profits/2020/07/06/66d7ca2a-bf9e-11ea-8908-68a2b9eae9e0_story.html
PN2X].
4.

[https://perma.cc/3HH8-

See Grace Maral Burnett, Analysis: S&P500Buyback SuspensionsDroppedto Zero

in June, BLOOMBERG L. (July 8,2020,4:37 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-lawanalysis/analysis-s-p-500-buyback-suspensions-dropped-to-zero-in-june

[https://perma.cc/Z63Q-

QHMJ].
5.
See Jessica Bursztynsky, Apple Now Has $192.8 Billion in Cash on Hand, Down from
Last Quarter, CNBC (Apr. 30, 2020, 4:41 PM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/apple-q22020-cash-hoard-heres-how-much-apple-has-on-hand.html [https://perma.cc/B9TQ-4XV3].
6.
See Daniel B. Kline, Starbucks Remains Committed to Share Buybacks, NASDAQ
(Mar. 20, 2020, 1:28 PM EST), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/starbucks-remains-committed-to-

share-buybacks-2020-03-20 [https://perma.cc/Q455-DVUB].
7.
See Wayne Duggan, Why WarrenBuffett May Have ChangedHis Tune on Berkshire
Buybacks, YAHOO FIN. (July 16, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-warren-buffett-may-

changed-180101505.html [https://perma.cc/583Q-CFBF].
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presidential nomination-including Senators Bernie Sanders,8 Elizabeth
Warren,9 Cory Booker, 0 and Kirsten Gillibrand"-put forward or endorsed proposals to restrict corporate share repurchases or to limit the
ability of corporate insiders to participate in buybacks. The party's eventual nominee, now-President-elect Joe Biden, called on CEOs to halt buybacks for a year after COVID-19 struck." Robert Jackson, Jr., a Democratic member of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) until
2020, has described trading around the time of buyback announcements as
"troubling" and called on the SEC to "reexamine our rules in this area."13
And antipathy toward buybacks crosses party lines. On the Republican
side, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida has called for tax-law changes to end
the current "tax code's favoritism" for buybacks over dividends. 4 President Donald Trump, who arguably added fuel to the buyback trend by
signing the 2017 tax cuts into law, told reporters in March 2020 that he
"never liked stock buybacks" either."
Attention to buybacks from presidents and prominent politicians is a
recent phenomenon, but scholars of tax law have been thinking about the
problems posed by share repurchases for decades. Last year marked the

8.
See Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Opinion, Schumer andSanders:LimitCorporate Stock Buybacks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/opinion/chuck-schumer-bernie-sanders.html [https://perma.cc/RJ66-MLCM] ("Our bill will prohibit a
corporation from buying back its own stock unless it invests in workers and communities first,
including things like paying all workers at least $15 an hour, providing seven days of paid sick
leave, and offering decent pensions and more reliable health benefits.").
9.
See Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, CompaniesShouldn'tBe Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 7:01 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-to-shareholders-1534287687
[https://perma.cc/Z6DVYXKE] (proposing that directors and officers be barred from selling company shares within three
years of a buyback).

10.

See Worker Dividend Act of 2018, S. 2505, 115th Cong.

§ 2(a) (2d Sess.

2018) (intro-

duced by Senator Booker) (proposing that publicly traded corporation be required to pay a
"worker dividend" equal to the lesser of the amount paid by the corporation to repurchase its
securities on the open market or 50% of U.S. earnings above $250 million).
11.
Senators Gillibrand and Warren were cosponsors of the Reward Work Act, which
would have repealed a Securities and Exchange Commission regulatory safe harbor for corporate
share repurchases. See Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
12.
See Jacob Pramuk, Joe Biden Urges 'EveryCEOin America'to Committo No Stock

Buybacks

for

a

Year,

CNBC

(Mar.

20,

2020,

11:14

AM

EST),

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/20/coronavirus-updates-joe-biden-urges-no-stock-buybacks-for-ayear.html [https://perma.cc/6NG5-NRP2].
13.
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the Center for
American Progress on Stock Buybacks and Corporate Cashouts (June 11, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-jackson-061118 [https://perma.cc/3Z4E-8EQG].
14.
Marco Rubio, America Needs to Restore Dignity of Work, ATLANTIC (Dec. 13,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/help-working-class-voters-us-must-

value-work/578032 [https://perma.cc/35PX-LSYK].
15.
Steve Holland & Alexandra Alper, Trump Slams Companies for Using US. Tax
Credit to Buy Back Stocks, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2020, 5:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-trump-buybacks/trump-slams-companies-for-using-u-s-tax-credit-to-

buy-back-stocks-idUSKBN2173HY [https://perma.cc/2QHQ-JALL].
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fiftieth anniversary of the seminal article on buybacks in the tax-law literature: OptionalRedemptions and OptionalDividends: Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, published in the Yale Law Journalin 1969 by
then-Yale Law School professor Marvin A. Chirelstein.1 6 In that article,
Chirelstein proposed a new income tax regime for buybacks that aimed to
eliminate the buyback tax advantage." In brief: Chirelstein would treat the
amount of the buyback as a cash dividend paid out to all shareholders on
a pro rata basis, thus triggering dividend tax obligations for all taxpaying
shareholders and capital gains or losses for those who choose to cash out
their shares.1 8 By eliminating the tax advantage of buybacks over dividends, Chirelstein's proposal-which we explain in much more detail below-would render buybacks a less attractive mechanism for returning
capital to shareholders.
Subsequent scholarship on the taxation of share repurchases has
taken note of Chirelstein's proposal but questioned its political feasibility.
Professor Ethan Yale has emphasized the "public relations difficulty" created by the fact that Chirelstein's proposal would require shareholders who
do not participate in the buyback to pay a dividend tax.1 9 Professor Bret
Wells, though sympathetic to Chirelstein's idea, has echoed the public-relations concern.2 0 For most of its first half-century of life, Chirelstein's proposal looked like it was destined for the same fate as other tax policy ideas
that appeal to wonkish professors and think-tank analysts but appear to be
political nonstarters - a category that also might include the taxation of net
imputed rent on owner-occupied homes, 2' retrospective capital gains taxation,22 and the taxation of life insurance "buildup." 23

The sudden surge in the volume of-and attention to-corporate
share repurchases potentially alters the political calculus. As lawmakers
and regulators search for policies that can stem the rising buyback tide,
Chirelstein's proposal may finally have its moment. Indeed, Senator Rubio
included a citation to Chirelstein's article in a recent report-though on

16.

Marvin A. Chirelstein, OptionalRedemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the

Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739 (1969).

17.
18.

Id at 751-55.
Id.

19.

Ethan Yale, CorporateDistributions Tax Reform: Exploring the Alternatives, 29

VA. TAX REV. 329, 353 (2009).
20.

See Bret Wells, Reform of CorporateDistributionsin Subchapter C, 37 VA. TAX

REV. 365, 396 (2018) (citing Yale, supra note 19, at 353).
21.
22.

See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, The Concept ofIncome, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 84 (1990).
See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV.

167 (1991).
23.

Calvin H. Johnson, Andrew Pike & Eric A. Lustig, Tax on Insurance Buildup, 112

TAX NOTES 665 (2009).
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page 74 and footnote 287 of a dense 78-page document, 24 it was hardly a
Warholian "fifteen minutes of fame." Unlike some of the other anti-buyback proposals, Chirelstein's scheme has the virtue of being intellectually
defensible. And it would almost certainly raise revenue-in the ballpark of
$70 billion to $80 billion a year in the near term25-making it a potentially
attractive add-on to future budget bills that strive for revenue neutrality or
deficit reduction.
Yet the most persuasive reasons to adopt Chirelstein's proposal have
nearly nothing to do with the concerns of current buyback critics. The contention that stock buybacks cannibalize long-term investment is doubtful
at best; the claim that buybacks benefit corporate executives at the expense
of other shareholders is not well-supported either. 26 Nor is Chirelstein's
case for his own proposal particularly persuasive a half-century later.
Chirelstein's chief concern was that differential treatment of buybacks
"distort[ed] the customary and intended pattern of taxation." 27 By now,
though, differential treatment of buybacks and dividends is the custom,
and it is hard to say that Congress-which has acquiesced to the status quo
for decades-"intends" any other result.
There are, however, a number of more powerful arguments in favor
of Chirelstein's idea-arguments absent from Chirelstein's original article
and largely overlooked in the current buyback debate. One argument relates to the so-called "Mark Zuckerberg problem" 28: the effective nontaxation of founders of phenomenally successful companies with zero-dividend policies who hold their shares until death and benefit from a step-up
in basis. 29 A second pertains to the "Panama Papers problem": the ability
of foreign investors who hold stock in tax-haven jurisdictions to avoid U.S.
tax-and potentially any tax-on U.S. equity gains. Chirelstein, to be sure,
cannot be faulted for failing to consider these points. The rise of zero- and

24.
SENATE

Marco Rubio, Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry, U.S.
COMMITTEE ON SMALL

BUS.

&

ENTREPRENEURSHIP 74 n.287

(Feb.

12, 2019),

https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/dc6db46-1a68-481a-b96e356c8100f1b7/3EDECA923DB439A8E884C6229A4C6003.02.12.19-final-sbc-project-mic2025report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV52-WSQV].
25.
For our explanation on the basis for this revenue estimate, see infra notes 179-183,
190 and accompanying text. We calculate a $74 billion yield based on revenue gains from foreign
shareholders alone.
26.
See infra Section
.ILA.
27.
Chirelstein, supranote 16, at 756.

28.
(2017).

Edward D. Kleinbard, The Right Tax at the Right Time, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 208, 299

29.
We find that the nontaxation of nonredeeming shareholders is especially problematic
in the context of corporate founders because their gains are likely best characterized as a form of
labor income, which ought to be taxed even under theories of optimal taxation that prescribe a
zero rate on capital income. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of
an Ideal Consumption Tax over an IdealIncome Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006).
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low-dividend stocks largely postdated Chirelstein's article,30 as did the
growth in foreign ownership of U.S. equities. 31 It is either a remarkable
coincidence or an extraordinary testament to Chirelstein's clairvoyance
that the strongest reasons to adopt his proposal today arise from trends
that took off well after he wrote.
In short, while Chirelstein's proposal has much to recommend it, the
arguments in its favor are distinct from the arguments that Chirelstein offered and from the anti-buyback arguments that make the proposal politically attractive. More than a half century after its inception, Chirelstein's
proposal has finally found both a purpose and a potential set of friends.
This Article seeks to explain the modern-day virtues of Chirelstein's proposal as well as its plausible political appeal and possible pitfalls.
Our analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces the basics of
buybacks, explains the difference in the tax treatment of buybacks and dividends, and traces the meteoric rise of buybacks in recent years. Part II
presents Chirelstein's proposal and discusses the major challenges that implementation would entail. Part III evaluates the case for taxing buybacks
like cash dividends. We find that the arguments for Chirelstein's proposal
based on the concerns of current buyback critics are weak, and Chirelstein's own arguments do little to move the dial. However, a number of
relatively recent developments in U.S. equity markets give rise to strong
tax policy arguments in the proposal's favor. Part IV ends with reflections
on Chirelstein's proposal in the context of broader changes to capital taxation and trends in legal scholarship.
I. The Basics of Buybacks
A. Buybacks andDividends as Alternative Mechanismsfor Returning
Capitalto Shareholders
When a corporation earns profits, it can reinvest those profits or distribute them to its shareholders. 32 If it chooses to distribute the profits, the
corporation can redeem (i.e., buy back) outstanding shares, or it can issue
cash dividends. If it buys back shares, the number of outstanding shares
shrinks, while if it issues cash dividends, the number of outstanding shares
remains the same. Nevertheless, as tax lawyers understood well before
Chirelstein's 1969 article, the two transactions are "essentially

30.
See S&P 500 Dividend Yield by Year, MULTIPL, https://www.multpl.com/s-p-500dividend-yield/table/by-year [https://perma.cc/B43R-X7QQ].
31.
See Summary of Report on ForeignPortfolio Investment in the United States, U.S.
DEP'T TREASURY (Dec. 31, 1997), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/shl94sum.aspx [https://perma.cc/9DXR-NCUJ].
32.
Note that a corporation need not earn profits in order to engage in buybacks or pay
dividends. It could instead finance buybacks or dividends out of cash reserves or borrowed funds.
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equivalent"-or, at least, can be. 33 Two transactions-one denominated a
buyback, the other characterized as a cash dividend-can achieve economically identical results both for the corporation and for its shareholders.
To illustrate, consider the following two examples:
Example 1. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by repurchasing 50
shares. A chooses to redeem all 50 of her shares; B chooses not to redeem.
The total cost of the buyback to ChirelsteinCorp is $100; A receives $100
and B receives 0; and the value of each ChirelsteinCorp share remains $2.
B now owns all 50 outstanding shares of ChirelsteinCorp, which is worth

$100.
Example 2. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by issuing a cash dividend of $1 per share, causing the value of each share to fall from $2 back to
$1. Afterwards, Buses the $50 she has received through the cash dividend
to purchase A's 50 shares. B now owns all 100 outstanding shares of ChirelsteinCorp, which is worth $100.

Aside from the tax consequences, to which we will turn in a moment,
the only practical differences between Example 1 (the buyback) and Example 2 (the cash dividend) are cosmetic. Either way, ChirelsteinCorp distributes $100 to shareholders. Either way, A ends up with $100 of cash, and
B ends up owning all of ChirelsteinCorp, which has total equity of $100.
The only difference is that in Example 1, B ends up with 50 shares worth
$2 each, while in Example 2, B ends up with 100 shares worth $1 each. But
no one is richer or poorer (pre-tax) in one example than in another, and
no one has a larger or smaller stake in ChirelsteinCorp.

33.

Chirelstein, supranote 16, at 739.
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Table 1. Economic Consequences of Buybacks vs. Dividends
A
B
Example 1
InitialHoldings
After Corp Earns$100
Profits
$100 Buyback
FinalHoldings

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

-50 shares x $2
0

0
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $1

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $1

-50 shares x $1

+50 shares x $1

0

100 shares x $1

Example 2
InitialHoldings
After Corp Earns$100
Profits
$100 Dividend
Holdings

Post-Dividend
Post-Dividend
Purchase/Sale
FinalHoldings

Notwithstanding the economic equivalence, though, Example 1 (buyback) leads to very different tax consequences than Example 2 (cash dividends). But before delving into the tax treatment of buybacks and dividends, it is worth pausing to consider the nontax reasons why a firm might
choose one method or the other to distribute earnings to shareholders.
First, a company may have genuine nontax reasons for wanting its
share price to remain above a certain threshold-for example, because a
particular stock exchange will delist a company's shares if they fall below
a particular price. 34 But the minimum share price for the New York Stock
Exchange and Nasdaq is $1,3s so this factor cannot explain the buyback
decisions of firms whose share prices are comfortably above that floor.
A second nontax reason for corporations to choose buybacks over
cash dividends results from the interaction between corporate distributions
and employee stock options. To illustrate: imagine that ChirelsteinCorp
hires a manager and offers her-as part of her pay package-call options

34.
See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Maureen O'Hara & David Pompilio, Down and Out in
the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of the DelistingProcess, 51 J.L. & EcoN. 683, 687-88

(2008).
35.
See Bob Haring, The Minimum Stock Price for NYSE, ZACKS, https://finance.zacks.com/minimum-stock-price-nyse-5116.htm
[https://perma.cc/JW7A-JA7B]; Tiffany
C. Wright, Nasdaq Delisting Rules, ZACKS, https://finance.zacks.com/nasdaq-delisting-rules-

7450.html [https://perma.cc/S684-43H3].
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on ChirelsteinCorp stock with a strike price of $1.10 per share. 36 If ChirelsteinCorp distributes earnings to shareholders via a buyback, then the
share price remains at $2, and the manager's call options are "in the
money" (i.e., the share price is higher than the strike price). If ChirelsteinCorp distributes earnings to shareholders via a dividend, then the share
price falls back to $1, and the manager's call options are "out of the
money." Insofar as managers with stock options have influence over the
choice between buybacks and dividends, they will generally prefer buybacks.3 7

Third, corporations may choose buybacks over cash dividends for
nontax reasons if managers believe the firm's shares are undervalued. 38 Recall that a buyback is the equivalent of a cash dividend followed by a purchase of shares by nonredeeming shareholders from redeeming shareholders. If managers who own shares in the company believe that the shares are
undervalued, and if the managers do not redeem their own shares in the
buyback, then the buyback effectively allows the managers to purchase
shares at what they believe to be a bargain price.
Finally, corporations may choose buybacks over cash dividends to defend against hostile takeovers. Unlike a cash dividend, a buyback increases
the ownership percentage of nonredeeming shareholders. Managers who
hold minority interests in a corporation may initiate a buyback-but not
redeem any of their own shares -in order to increase their ownership stake
and thus reduce the probability that a hostile tender offer will succeed.39
But again, managers can accomplish the same result by issuing cash dividends and then using their dividends to buy shares, so buybacks are not the
only way for managers to increase their percentage holdings.4 0
Many of the nontax reasons for choosing a dividend over a buyback
are symmetrical to the above-listed reasons for choosing a buyback over a

36.
A call option is an option that entitles the holder to purchase the underlying asset for
the strike price on or before a certain time.
37.
See Richard A. Lambert, William N. Lanen & David F. Larcker, Executive Stock
Option PlansandCorporateDividendPolicy, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 409 (1989).
Prior to the enactment of section 409A, a few companies compensated managers with "dividendprotected" stock options that aimed to offset the effect of dividends on option value, but dividendprotected stock options were rare among U.S. firms. See Marckus C. Arnold & Robert M. Gillenkirch, Stock Options and DividendProtection, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
453, 453-54 (2005). Section 409A, which became effective in 2005, now effectively imposes severe
penalties on firms that incorporate dividend-protection provisions in compensatory stock options.
See infra Section I.C.
38.
See, e.g., Theo Vermaelen, Common Stock Repurchases andMarket Signaling:An

EmpiricalStudy, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 139 (1981).
39.

See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99

HARV. L. REV. 1377, 1393 (1986).
40.
Arguably, buybacks solve a collective action problem among managers, who otherwise would have to agree on how many shares each one should purchase on the open market (with
potential incentives to freeride). However, a similar collective action problem exists with buybacks
if managers are free to redeem shares themselves.
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dividend. First, a company may have nontax reasons for wantingits share
price to fall. At some point, very high share prices become cumbersome
for investors-a case in point being Berkshire Hathaway's Class A shares,
which traded at over $320,000 per share as of this writing. 4' Yet, this explanation likely applies to only a few phenomenally successful companies
whose share prices rise so much as to become unwieldy.42 And even in
those cases, a company can reduce its share price through a stock split.
Second, a company may choose cash dividends over buybacks precisely because the individuals making the distribution decision do not want to benefit managers with stock options. Third, a corporation may choose cash
dividends over buybacks if managers think that shares are overvalued. If
other shareholders-but not the managers-are enrolled in "dividend reinvestment plans" (DRIPs) that automatically use dividends to buy new
shares, then issuing dividends allows managers to reduce their stake in the
corporation. 43

Several other shareholder-side reasons explain a possible preference
for cash dividends over buybacks. First, some mutual funds and other institutional investors are required to maintain a certain percentage of dividend-paying securities in their portfolios. 44 This helps to explain why some
companies, such as General Electric, have chosen to pay a dividend of one
penny per share rather than eliminating dividends entirely.45 Concededly,
this explanation for cash dividends is incomplete, as it still leaves the question as to why a mutual fund or other institutional investor would commit
itself to holding dividend-paying securities -a question to which path dependency may be the only answer.
Second, some trusts and endowments are structured such that the "income" and "principal" are treated differently. For example, an endowment's terms may stipulate that the income-including dividends-can be

41.
See
Berkshire
Hathaway Inc
BRKA,
N.Y.
STOCK
EXCHANGE,
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:BRK.A [https://perma.cc/2TBE-8K3H].
42.
See Matt Levine, Who Cares What Apple's Stock PriceIs? BLOOMBERG OPINION

(Apr. 25, 2014, 1:49 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-04-25/whocares-what-apple-s-stock-price-is [https://perma.cc/JFQ7-ELGG].
43.
Once again, managers can achieve much the same outcome by selling some of their
own shares on the open market. An advantage of pursuing this outcome through dividends rather
than sales is that companies' insider-trading policies often do not apply to participation or non-

participation in a DRIP. See, e.g., BlackRock, Inc., Personal Trading Policy (Apr. 4, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1100663/000119312514241353/d745741dex99p2.htm
[https://perma.cc/5DVJ-KLBA] (exempting dividend-reinvestment plans from preclearance requirement in Section 5).

44.
mary

See, e.g., BlackRock, Inc., BlackRock Equity Dividend Fund: Class K Shares (Sum-

Prospectus)

(Nov.

28,

2018),

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814507/

000119312518343088/d647539d497k.htm [https://perma.cc/HX5T-CGET].
(Dec.

45.
7,

See, e.g., Michael Sheetz, GE Makes It Official, Lowers Dividend to a Penny, CNBC
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/07/ge-makes-it-official-lowers-dividend-to-a-

penny.html [https://perma.cc/3UHU-UE53].
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spent each year, while the principal-including capital appreciation-cannot be. A charitable institution may therefore have an incentive to invest
endowment assets in dividend-paying securities in order to generate usable
income. 46 Anecdotally, though, we know of very few major institutional
investors still subject to restrictions of this sort.
Third, some investors (e.g., retirees living off their savings) may have
a preference for liquidity that cash dividends satisfy. But in an era in which
major brokerages will conduct commission-free trades,47 it is relatively
easy for these same investors to generate "homemade dividends" by selling
their shares when they desire liquidity. Moreover, while companies that
distribute earnings through buybacks rather than dividends impose transaction costs on shareholders with a preference for liquidity, companies that
distribute earnings through cash dividends rather than buybacks impose
transaction costs on shareholders with a preference for reinvesting those
dividends. 48 Still, cash dividends potentially allow retail investors to access
liquidity without the "regret" that may come from selling shares of a stock
whose price then rises-which the behavioral economics literature suggests may be a benefit. 49
All of this is to say that there are plausible-but, for the most part,
not powerful-reasons why some managers and shareholders may prefer
buybacks over cash dividends or vice versa. As a general rule, and setting
tax considerations aside, managers and shareholders can achieve equivalent pretax economic outcomes through either approach. As the next Section explains, however, tax rules upset the near-equivalence in significant
ways.
B. A Primeron the Taxation of Buybacks andDividends
The taxation of buybacks and dividends is a story of clienteles. By
"clienteles," we refer to different groups of taxpayers across whom the tax
treatment of buybacks and dividends varies starkly.50 For some clienteles,

46.
See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often PreferDividends to Capital
Gain andDebt Investments to Equity-A Daunting Principaland Income Problem, 32 REAL

PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 255 (1997).
47.

See, e.g., Commissions, Margin Rates, andFees, FIDELITY INV., https://www.fidel[https://perma.cc/HP8N-G6MJ].
48.
Some, but not all, companies offer "no-fee" dividend reinvestment plans. See, e.g.,
No-Fee
DRIPs,
DIRECTINVESTING.COM,
https://www.directinvesting.com/search/
no_fees_list.cfm [https://perma.cc/W6T3-4NE6]. Note, though, that "no-fee" dividend-reinvestment plans simply shift the transaction costs associated with dividend reinvestment from the shareholder to the corporation.
49.
For a regret-aversion theory of cash dividend preferences, see Hersh M. Shefrin
Meir Statman, ExplainingInvestor Preferencefor Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 268-71
&

ity.com/trading/commissions-margin-rates

(1984).
50.

See Franklin Allen, Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivan Welch, A Theory of Dividends

Based on Tax Clienteles, 55 J. FIN. 2499 (2000).
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the tax treatment of buybacks is more favorable than the tax treatment of
dividends. For others, it is the reverse. Still others are indifferent to the
form in which corporations distribute earnings to shareholders. We consider the perspectives of U.S. individuals, foreigners, U.S. corporations,
and tax-exempt investors.
1. U.S. Individuals
We start with individual U.S. citizens and residents who hold stock in
taxable accounts. These individual taxpayers generally fare better when
corporations distribute earnings through buybacks rather than dividends.
Under section 302,5' a buyback is generally treated as the disposition of a
capital asset, and only the amount realized over the taxpayer's basis is included in gross income. By contrast, the entire amount of a dividend is included in gross income. Prior to 2003, dividends were treated as ordinary
income, which for individuals was taxed at a higher rate than long-term
capital gains.52 Since 2003, income from dividends paid by domestic corporations and certain foreign corporations has been classified as "qualified
dividend income," which for individuals has been taxed at the same rate as
long-term capital gains.s 3 But despite the post-2003 rate equivalence, different rules regarding realization and basis for buybacks and dividends
have preserved the tax advantage of the former for U.S. individuals.
To illustrate: consider again Example 1 above, in which ChirelsteinCorp buys back 50 shares from A at a price of $2 per share. The buyback
is a realization event for A, and A has a capital gain equal to the amount
realized ($100) minus her cost basis ($50), or $50. If A has held her ChirelsteinCorp shares for more than a year, the gain will be taxed at the longterm capital-gain rate, which-for taxpayers in the highest income tax
bracket-is currently 20%. 5 The buyback from A would not be a realization event for B, so B would pay no tax on the transaction.
Now consider Example 2, in which ChirelsteinCorp issues a cash dividend of $1 per share and B then uses her cash dividend to buy A's shares.
Assuming again that the qualified-dividend provision applies, A and B
would each pay tax at the long-term capital-gain rate on their $50 of qualified dividend income. If both are in the top bracket, the tax for each one
is 20% times $50, or $10. If B then buys A's shares, A would experience a

§ 302

51.

I.R.C.

52.

See STAFF OF THE

(2018).
JOINT COMM.

ON TAXATION,

108TH

CONG.,

GENERAL

EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108" CONGRESS 23 (Comm. Print 2005),
http://www.jct.gov/s-5-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KJX-DBW3]; David Hunkar, US. Dividendsand
CapitalGains Tax Rate Since 1961, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 7, 2011), https://seekingalpha.com/article/285468-u-s-dividends-and-the-capital-gains-tax-rate-since-1961
[https://perma.cc/3Z3K-

AY59].
53.

See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Star. 752,760-61 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018)).
54.
I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018).

§ 302(a),
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realization event-though in this example, the sale price ($1 per share) is
equal to A's purchase price, so no capital-gain tax is owed.
In Example 1 (buyback), the total tax paid by A is $10. In Example 2
(dividend), the total tax is $20 (i.e., $10 for each one). To be sure, the buyback approach does not necessarily eliminate tax liability-rather, it defers
tax liability. In Example 1, Bis left with 50 shares of ChirelsteinCorp stock,
which she purchased for $50 and which are now worth $100. When she
sells - assuming the long-term capital-gain rate remains the same -she will
owe a tax of $10. In Example 2, Bis left with 100 shares of ChirelsteinCorp
stock and basis of $100, so she will owe no tax at the time of sale unless
ChirelsteinCorp's share price rises in the future. Thus, either way (and with
caveats soon to follow), B will ultimately pay $10 of tax; the difference between the buyback approach and the dividend approach is that with the
buyback approach, she pays the $10 later, while with the dividend approach, she pays the $10 now.
Deferring the $10 tax liability is potentially a benefit to B if the nominal interest rate is greater than zero (as it generally is). Note that this deferral benefit arises even if B redeems some but not all of her shares in the
buyback. The reason is that when B redeems some of her shares, she pays
capital gains tax on the amount realized minus basis, while when she receives a dividend, the entire amount of the dividend is included in income.
So in Example 1, if B had redeemed one share of ChirelsteinCorp stock at
a price of $2, she would have paid capital gains tax on $1 (i.e., the amount
realized minus her basis of $1 per share), while if she had received a $2
dividend, the entire dividend would have been taxable immediately.
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Table 2. Tax Consequences of Buybacks vs. Dividends
A
B
Example 1

Tax at 20% rate
UnrealizedCapital
Gains

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2
-50 shares x $2
0
$0
$0
50 shares x ($2 - $1) =
$50
$50 x 20% = $10
$0

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2
-

InitialHoldings
After Corp Earns$100
Profits
$100 Buyback
FinalHoldings
Taxable Dividends
Tax at 20% rate
Taxable CapitalGains

50 shares x $2
$0
$0

0
$0
50 shares x ($2 - $1)
= $50

Example 2
InitialHoldings
After Corp Earns$100
Profits
$100 Dividend
Holdings

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $1

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $1

-50 shares x $1

+50 shares x $1

0
$50
$50x20% = $10
50 shares x ($1 - $1) =
$0
$0
$0

100 shares x $1
$50
$50x20% = $10

Post-Dividend

Tax at 20% rate
Unrealized
CapitalGains

0
$0
100 shares x ($1
$1) = $0

-

Post-Dividend
Purchase/Sale
FinalHoldings
Taxable Dividends
Tax at 20% rate
Taxable CapitalGains

The benefit of deferral is not, however, the only potential tax benefit
of the buyback approach. Most significantly, the step-up in basis at death 55
means that if B holds her shares for the rest of her life and bequeaths them
to her children or other heirs, she can avoid tax on her $50 capital gain
entirely. As we discuss below, this rule, with an assist from the tax law's
treatment of buybacks, results in what the late Edward Kleinbard memorably called "the Mark Zuckerberg problem." 6 The problem, in brief, is
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See id § 1014.

56.

Kleinbard, supra note 28, at 299.
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that current law allows founders of successful companies to amass and consume tremendous fortunes without paying any tax on those gains. They do
this by acquiring stock when their companies are initially formed (often
literally for pennies) and then by holding that stock until they die, at which
point their heirs can sell their shares without any income tax due to the
stepped-up basis rule. In the meantime, the corporation can distribute
earnings to the shareholders via buybacks, and the founders will face no
tax liability as long as they do not redeem their shares. We discuss the Mark
Zuckerberg problem further in Section III.D.
The buyback approach-which allows Bto avoid immediate taxation
of dividends and instead hold stock with unrealized gains -confers benefits
on B even if she does not hold her stock until death and benefit from the
step-up in basis. If B ultimately contributes her ChirelsteinCorp shares to
charity, she can avoid tax on her capital gain as well. Better yet, if B has
held her shares for more than a year, she can claim a charitable contribution deduction for the fair market value of those shares, including the untaxed appreciation.57 Even if B does not hold her shares until death or donate them to charity, she can time her sale of ChirelsteinCorp stock for a
year in which she is in a lower bracket. And if B has capital losses that
would otherwise go unused, she can use them to soak up the $50 capital
gain. Because capital losses generally can be used to offset capital gains but
not dividend income, 58 this is an additional advantage of the buyback approach.
Before leaving behind the tax treatment of individuals, one final point
merits mention: section 302 of the Code, which governs the tax treatment
of buybacks, provides that a corporation's redemption (i.e., repurchase) of
its own shares will be treated as a payment in exchange for stock-and not
as a cash dividend-"if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend." 59 The Supreme Court has held that a redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend if it results "in a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation." 60 For repurchases by public companies, which are the focus of this Article, the IRS
generously has determined that anyreduction in percentage ownership interest by a non-controlling shareholder qualifies as a meaningful reduction. 61 As a practical matter, this means that repurchases by public

57.

See I.R.C.

§ 170(e)(1)(A).

58.
See id. § 1211(b). For individual taxpayers, net capital losses can offset ordinary income to the extent of $3,000 per year.

59.
60.
61.

Id. § 302(a)-(b)(1).
United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92 (ruling that where a redeeming shareholder goes

from a .00011118% interest in the corporation to a .0001081% interest, the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend because "the redemption involves a minority shareholder whose
relative stock interest . . . is minimal and who exercises no control over the affairs of [the
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corporations will almost always be treated as buybacks giving rise to capital
gains (or losses) rather than as dividends. 62
For nonpublic companies, the legal regime is rather more complicated. Any transaction in which a shareholder redeems (i.e., sells back) all
of her stock will automatically be treated as a repurchase. 63 Thus, in Example 1, where A sold back all of her shares, the transaction would clearly
qualify as a buyback rather than a dividend. 64 Likewise, a transaction is
automatically treated as repurchase-and not as a dividend-if a shareholder reduces her voting and total interest by more than one fifth (e.g.,
from 10% to less than 8%) and ends up with less than 50% of the voting
power in the company. 65
For transactions that do not trigger automatic buyback treatment, the
Supreme Court's meaningful-reduction test must be applied. In the context
of closely held corporations, the test is a facts-and-circumstance standard.
For example, in a 1975 IRS revenue ruling, a reduction of a shareholder's
interest from 57% of a corporation's common stock to 50% qualified as a
meaningful reduction when there was only one other shareholder because
the redeeming shareholder went from having full control of the corporation to being positioned in a deadlock situation. The redemption therefore
was treated as a sale and not a dividend. 66 A revenue ruling the following
year reached the same result where the redeemed shareholder's interest
was reduced from 27% to 22.27%. The IRS reasoned that-in light of the
ownership percentages of other shareholders in the same corporation-the
transaction meant that the taxpayer would now need the support of two

corporation, and] as a result of the redemption, [the shareholder] experienced a reduction of its
voting rights, its right to participate in current earnings and accumulated surplus, and its right to
share in net assets on liquidation").
62.
One exception would be where the redeeming shareholder has a sufficiently large
post-redemption interest in the public company to allow her to continue to exercise some degree
of practical control over the corporation. Another exception would be where the redeeming shareholder sold a smaller percentage of her shares than the percentage reduction of outstanding shares
as a result of all of redemptions pursuant to the plan of redemption. For example, if a corporation
with 100,000,000 shares outstanding redeems 5,000,000 shares, any shareholder who redeems
shares totaling 5% or less of her shares would not qualify. Consider a shareholder who owns 5,000
shares before the redemption and who redeems 250 shares. Her percentage ownership would be

unchanged: from 5,000/100,000,000 (0.005%) to 4,750/95,000,000 (0.005%). Accordingly, the redemption would be treated as a dividend, see I.R.C. § 302(a), and the basis of the redeemed shares
would be shifted over to the shareholder's remaining shares. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (2007)
(requiring "proper adjustment of the basis of the remaining stock" where the redemption is
treated as a dividend).

63.

I.R.C.

§ 302(b)(3).

64.
Technically, this qualifies under a safe harbor that provides for sale treatment when
there is a complete termination. See id A similar safe harbor applies in the case of substantially
disproportionate redemptions, which are determined by mathematical formulas. See id §

302(b)(2).
65.
66.
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other shareholders in order to constitute a majority (whereas she previously could have done so with only one other). 67
While U.S. individuals who hold stock in taxable accounts have a tax
incentive to prefer buybacks over dividends, those investors account for a
relatively small fraction of all U.S. corporation stockholdings. According
to a recent estimate by researchers at the Tax Policy Center, only around
25% of outstanding C corporation stock is held directly or indirectly by
U.S. households in taxable accounts. 68 Another 40% is held by foreign residents, making it especially important to consider the way that U.S. and
foreign tax rules affect those investors' preferences for buybacks versus
dividends. 69
2. Foreigners
For foreign investors-nonresident aliens and foreign corporationsthe rules are different, but the result is generally the same: the U.S. federal
income-tax treatment of buybacks is more generous than the tax treatment
of dividends. 70
The United States generally does not tax nonresident aliens and foreign corporations on capital gains from the sale of U.S. securities. 7 ' Thus,
for those investors, buybacks are effectively U.S. tax-free. The United
States does, however, tax dividends paid by U.S. corporations to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. For those investors, the standard tax
rate on dividends is 30%, and the dividend tax is withheld at the source by
the issuing corporation. 72 Tax treaties often reduce this 30% rate to 15%
(or 5% where the shareholder owns more than 10% of the issuing

67.

Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91.

68.
Steve Rosenthal & Theo Burke, Who's Left to Tax? US Taxation of Corporations
and Their Shareholders 1 (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Cr., Working Paper, 2020),
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Who's %20Left%20to%20Tax%3F%20US%
20Taxation%20of%20Corporations%20and%20Their %20Shareholders-%20Rosen-

thal%20and%20Burke.pdf [https://perma.cc/877L-J2LA].
69.

See id

70.
See Stanley Veliotis, Equating US. Tax Treatmentof Dividends and Capital Gains
for ForeignPortfolio Investors, 56 AM. Bus. L.J. 345 (2019) (noting the buyback advantage and
mentioning Chirelstein's article in passing, though not explaining how Chirelstein's proposal
would address the buyback advantage).
71.
See I.R.C. § 865(a) (2018) (providing that personal property sales of foreigners are
subject to various exceptions not relevant to stock sales, sourced outside the United States); id. §
871 (taxing foreign individuals who are not engaged in a trade or business in the United States
only on their United States source of income); id. § 881 (same for foreign corporations).

72.
See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (taxing dividends received by foreign individuals); id. §
881(a)(1)(A) (taxing dividends received by foreign corporations); id. § 1441 (imposing withholding tax on dividends received by foreign individuals); id.
idends received by foreign corporations).

§ 1442

(imposing withholding tax on div-

263

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 38:246 2021

corporation's shares), but none of the United States' tax treaties provide
for the total exemption of dividends.7 3
Often, a foreign investor's home jurisdiction will allow the foreign investor to credit U.S. taxes against her home jurisdiction tax liability. Even
so, the home jurisdiction's own tax rules will often reproduce the buyback
tax advantage. Although many countries nominally tax capital gains and
dividends paid to residents at the same rate, some of the same factors that
make buybacks more attractive to U.S. individual shareholders make them
more attractive to foreign shareholders as well. Shareholders who do not
sell their stock in a buyback can defer or strategically time their ultimate
sale, so investors in those countries will have a tax preference for buybacks
over dividends.7 4
Current law's treatment of foreign shareholders contributes to what
we call "the Panama Papers problem": the ability of high-net-worth individuals from around the world to accumulate significant gains from U.S.
equity investments without paying any tax anywhere. They can do this by
purchasing shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq via
entities in tax-haven jurisdictions. While the U.S. imposes a withholding
tax of up to 30% on dividends, no or little withholding tax is due if investors
buy no- or low-dividend-yield stocks that return all or most of their earnings to shareholders via buybacks. As a result, these stocks offer an attractive place for tax dodgers to park their cash. We discuss the Panama Papers problem in Section III.E below.
3. U.S. Corporations
Domestic corporations that hold stock in other domestic corporations
constitute a meaningful-though modest-share of the U.S. stockholding
base. Intercorporate equity holdings account for about 6% of total U.S.
public equity outstanding, according to a Tax Policy Center analysis of
Federal Reserve data. 75 For these shareholders, the tax preference for buybacks is potentially reversed. For domestic corporations, dividends and
capital gains are both taxed at the ordinary corporate rate, which is currently 21%. However, these corporations also generally receive a dividendreceived deduction equal to 50% of the dividend.7 6 The upshot is that

73.

See Table 1. Tax Rates on Income Other Than PersonalService Income Under

Chapter3, InternalRevenue Code, andIncome Tax Treaties, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb.
2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/Tax_Treaty_Table_1_2019_Feb.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3L3-

WYKB].
74.
See Marcus Jacob & Martin Jacob, Taxation, Dividends, and Share Repurchases:
Taking Evidence Global, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1241, 1249-1250 & tbl.2 (2013).
75.
See Rosenthal & Burke, supra note 68, at 12 tbl.1.
76.
See I.R.C. § 243. The deduction is 100% for dividends received by corporations who
own 80% or more of the issuing corporation.
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dividends received by corporations are typically taxed at an effective rate
of 10.5% -half the rate on capital gains.
The lower effective tax rate on dividends than on capital gains may
suggest that domestic corporations that hold shares in other corporations
have a straightforward tax incentive to prefer dividends over buybacks. In
fact, the incentives facing domestic corporations are more complicated.
First, domestic corporations potentially experience a tradeoff between the
deferral benefit of buybacks and the benefit of the lower effective rate for
dividends. 7 Second, corporations-like individuals-can use capital losses
to offset capital gains but not dividends. Thus, a corporation with significant unused capital losses may prefer to receive distributions via buyback
rather than cash dividend. 78 Depending on the particular circumstances of
the domestic corporation (including the length of time for which it plans to
hold shares and the extent of its unused capital losses), the tax benefits of
cash dividends may outweigh the benefits of buybacks or vice versa.79
4. Tax-Exempt Investors

Finally, note that a significant portion of U.S. corporate stock is held
by investors who have no tax preference for buybacks versus cash dividends. According to Tax Policy Center estimates, tax-exempt or tax-indifferent investors-including pension plans, individual retirement accounts
(IRAs), governmental and nonprofit institutions, and life insurers-held
around 37% of all U.S. corporate equity in 2019.80 Distributions to pensionplan participants and IRA holders are taxed the same way regardless of
whether they are funded from capital gains or cash dividends, so these
shareholders are (at least for tax purposes) indifferent between buybacks
and dividends. Meanwhile, investment income of nonprofit institutions is

77.
Recall that the deferral benefit arises because repurchases allow immediate use of
basis to offset proceeds, while dividends do not. This earlier use of basis results in tax deferral.
Deferral is less valuable in the context of corporations in part because they do not have the potential for a stepped-up basis at death. Dealers in securities must calculate tax on a mark-to-market basis, effectively eliminating the tax benefit of deferral. See id. § 475(a).
78.
The problem of unused capital losses is often more acute for corporations than individuals. While individuals may carry forward unused capital losses until they die, corporations may
carry back capital losses to the three prior taxable years or carry them forward for only five years.

Compare id.

§ 1212(b)

(allowing unlimited carrying forward for individuals), with

id. §

1212(a)

(allowing a three-year carryback and five-year carryforward for corporations).
79.
For a high-profile example of firms structuring a redemption as a dividend rather
than a buyback in order to achieve more favorable tax treatment, see Merle M. Erickson & Shiingwu Wang, Exploiting and Sharing Tax Benefits: Seagram andDuPont, 21 J. AM. TAX ASS'N, no.
2, 1999, at 35. In that case, Seagrams potentially saved $1.5 billion or more by structuring its redemption of DuPont shares as a dividend. See id at 41 tbl.1.
80.
See Rosenthal & Burke, supranote 68, at 14 tbl.4. Rosenthal and Burke's estimates24% of U.S. equities held by taxable domestic investors, 40% by foreigners, 37% by tax-exempt
or tax-indifferent investors-do not add to 100% due to rounding. For these purposes, intercorporate holdings are traced back to their ultimate owners.
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generally taxed very lightly or not at all, 8 and life insurers effectively pay
no tax on investment income on their reserves,8 2 so these shareholders have
few tax-related reasons to prefer buybacks over dividends or vice versa.
All of this serves to illustrate that the conventional wisdom that buybacks are tax-advantaged relative to dividends amounts to an oversimplification. Foreign investors and U.S.-resident taxable individuals will generally prefer buybacks to dividends, but U.S. corporations that hold stock
in other companies will not always share that preference, and a large segment of the shareholding population will be indifferent between the two
forms of corporate cash distributions. As we discuss in Part III, these various positions will have important implications for buyback tax policy.

Table 3. U.S. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Buybacks and
Dividends
Investor Type
Buybacks
Dividends
- Top rate on longterm capital gain =
23.8%
-Deferral advantage
(early basis recovery)
-Capital losses can be
used to offset
-Avoid tax entirely
through stepped-up
basis, charitable contributions
Foreigninvestors
-No U.S. tax (possibly home-country tax
consequences)
-Rate = 21%
US. corporations
-Deferral advantage
(early basis recovery)
-Capital losses can be
used to offset
Pensionplans, retire- -Indifferent

U.S. individuals (taxable accounts)

- Top rate on qualified dividends =
23.8%
-No immediate basis recovery
-Capital losses cannot be used to offset

-U.S. withholding
tax at rate of S 30%
-Rate = 10.5%
-No immediate basis recovery

ment accounts, non-

profit organizations,
life insurers

81.
Private foundations pay a tax of 1 to 2% on net investment income. See I.R.C. § 4940
(2018). Starting in 2018, private colleges and universities with endowment assets of $500,000 per
student or more are taxed at a rate equal to 1.4% of net investment income. See id § 4968. Private
foundations and wealthy colleges and universities have a slight tax incentive to prefer buybacks
over dividends because of the deferral advantage.

82.
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See I.R.C.

§§

805(a), 807(b).
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C. The Fallof Dividends and the Rise of Buybacks
Around the time that Chirelstein wrote his landmark article, cash dividends still were the dominant form of corporate distribution in the United
States. Gross buybacks by U.S. corporations remained less than 10% of
aggregate cash distributions until 1979, rising to approximately 12% by
1980, 29% by 1990, and 53% by 2000.83 By the third quarter of 2019, approximately 61% of cash distributions by S&P 500 firms came in the form
of buybacks (with the remainder in dividends). 84 Commentators now routinely refer to this recent period as a "buyback boom." 85
What explains the rise of buybacks relative to cash dividends? At least
three factors potentially contributed to the trend.
First, in November 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) promulgated Rule 10b-18 under the Exchange Act of 1934, which
provides issuers with a limited safe harbor from liability for market manipulation when they buy back their shares.86 Importantly, the Rule 10b-18
safe harbor applies to liability "solely by reason of the manner, timing,
price, and volume" of repurchases; 87 it does not affect liability for insider
trading when the corporation possesses material, nonpublic information
concerning the value of its securities. 88 Still, the SEC rule is widely credited
with reducing regulatory uncertainty surrounding buybacks 89 and it appears to be associated with a sharp rise in buybacks as a percentage of corporate cash distributions over the course of the 1980s.
Second, starting in the 1980s, stock option grants became an increasingly large component of compensation for executives and other employees. Whereas stock-option grants constituted only around 14% of direct
compensation for CEOs at the largest publicly traded U.S. companies in

83.
Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis, 57 J. FIN. 1649, 1655 tbl.1 (2002) (dividing the "REPO" column by the sum of
the "REPO" + "DIV" columns).
84.
Edward Yardeni, Joe Abbott & Mali Quintana, CorporateFinance Briefing: S&P
500 Buybacks & Dividends, YADENI RES., INC. 9 fig.11
(Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.yardeni.com/pub/bbdivepsyield.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FTY-KNNZ].
85.
See, e.g., Andrew Barry, Why the Buyback Boom Is Bullish forInvestors, BARRON'S

(May 12, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-the-buyback-boom-is-bullish-for-investors1526089472.
86.
See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-18 (2005).
87.
Id n.1.
88.

Div. Trading & Mkts., Answers to FrequentlyAsked Questions ConcerningRule

lOb-18 ('Safe Harbor"for Issuer Repurchases), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 2,
2016),

https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/r10b18faq0504.htm

[https://perma.cc/A8S8-

YTLT].
89.
On the history of Rule 10b-18, see Douglas O. Cook, Laurie Krigman & J. Chris
Leach, An Analysis of SEC Guidelinesfor Executing Open Market Repurchases, 76 J. Bus. 289,

292-93 (2003).
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1980, that figure had risen to 48% by 1994.90 Several factors account for
this phenomenon. Pressure from potential acquirers during the hostile
takeover boom of the 1980s encouraged corporations to adopt compensation arrangements that linked executive pay to share price. 91Academic researchers who advocated for equity-based compensation in the 1980s and
early 1990s also arguably played a role. 92 Then in 1993, Congress added
section 162(m) to the Internal Revenue Code, which limited the ability of
corporations to claim deductions for compensation to senior executives in
excess of $1 million unless those pay packages were performance-based. 93
Stock options were one type of performance-based compensation to which
corporations turned so that they could pay their top executives more than
$1 million and still deduct the full cost.94 The December 2017 tax law ended
the exception for performance-based pay. 95
To be sure, these developments do not explain why stock options, as
opposed to alternative forms of incentive-based pay, became predominant.
The preference for stock options in particular was likely largely a function
of financial accounting standards. A 1972 accounting rule instructed corporations not to treat compensatory stock-option grants as expenses unless
the strike price was lower than the company's share price at the time.96 The
effect of that rule was that corporations could compensate executives and
employees in valuable stock options that did not immediately reduce the
firms' reported profitability. The Financial Accounting Standards Board

90.
See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paidlike Bureaucrats?
113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 661 tbl.IIa (1998).
91.
See Amanda Bennett, A GreatLeapForwardforExecutive
Pay:Stock Options Propelled
Gains
by
CEOs
in
'88,
WALL.
ST.
J.
(Apr.
24,
1989),
https://search.proquest.com/docview/135406875 [https://perma.cc/724D-LH4Z].
See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been, How
92.
We Got Here, WhatAre the Problems, andHow to Fix Them 35 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation,

Orgs.

& Mkts

Unit, Working

Paper

No.

44,

2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=561305

[https://perma.cc/X6BM-T6Y3] (citing Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives:
It's Not How Much You Pay, but How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138; Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, PerformancePay and Top Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON.

225 (1990)).
93.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
312, 435, 470-71 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018)).
94.

§ 13211,

107 Star.

See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, What Happens When You Tax the Rich?Evidencefrom

Executive Compensation, 108 J. POL. ECON. 352, 368 (2000).
95.
Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13601(a), 131 Star. 2054, 2155-56 (2017) (amending I.R.C.
162(m)).
96.

See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON.

PERSP. 49, 54 (2003).
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changed that rule in 2004, with the change taking effect in 2006.97 Since
then, stock-option grants to top executives have declined significantly.98
The rise of stock-option grants between the early 1980s and the mid2000s helps to explain the increase in buybacks over that period. This is
because stock-option grants generally are not "dividend-protected." Recall that in Example 2 above, the decision to distribute earnings to shareholders through cash dividends rather than buybacks reduces the corporation's share price. When a company's share price declines, so too does the
value of employees' stock options. Managers who hold stock options thus
have an incentive to favor buybacks over cash dividends. Cross-firm comparisons provide some support for the view that option-based compensation contributed to the buyback rise. 99
In theory, corporations could grant "dividend-protected" stock options to executives and other employees. While there are several ways to
achieve dividend protection, one method commonly used in the over-thecounter options market (and therefore known as "over-the-counter dividend protection") is to reduce the strike price of a call option by the
amount of the dividend paid.' 00 However, U.S. tax rules have made overthe-counter dividend protection extremely unattractive for U.S. corporations compensating executives and other employees in option form. Compensatory stock options are subject to section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code if the exercise price could under any circumstances be reduced
below the fair market value of the stock on the day that the option was
granted.' 0' The consequences of section 409A's application are severe and
include acceleration of taxable income before exercise and a 20% excise
tax.1 02 Likewise, prior to the December 2017 tax law, the exemption from
section 162(m) for performance-based pay did not apply to stock options
if the exercise price could be reduced below fair market value as of the
grant date.1 03 A fair market value exercise price with dividend protection

97.
Press Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Issues Final Statement on Accounting
for
Share-Based
Payment
(Dec.
16,
2004),
https://www.fasb.org/news/nr121604_ebc.shtml [https://perma.cc/5QN3-LJLR].
98.
See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got
There, in 2A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211, 224 fig.2 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2013).
See Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchasesand Incentive Compensation (Nat'l Bureau
99.
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6467, 1998), https://www.nber.org/papers/w6467

[https://perma.cc/6SJN-QBCX].
100.
This turns out to provide imperfect dividend protection for call-option holders. For
a discussion, see Robert Geske, Richard Roll & Kuldeep Shastri, Over-the-CounterOption Market Dividend Protectionand "Biases"inthe Black-Scholes Model: A Note, 38 J. FIN. 1271 (1983).

101.
102.
103.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(A)(1) (2007).
See I.R.C. § 409A (2018).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (2015). The regulation does allow for the

payment of a "dividend equivalent" to the optionholder but only if the dividend equivalent payment is not contingent on the exercise of the option. The over-the-counter dividend protection,
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would not qualify for the exemption. Recall that one of the reasons for
paying executives in stock options so that compensation over $1 million
could be deductible to the corporation. Using dividend-protected stock options would have defeated this objective.
While the rise of stock-option-based compensation may help to explain the increasing frequency of buybacks from the 1980s until the mid2000s, stock options cannot account for the more recent uptick in buyback
activity over the last several years. That is because the buyback boom over
the past decade has come at a time when fewer firms are granting stock
options to executives and other employees, and stock options are coming
to constitute a smaller share of executive and employee pay.1 04 Stock
awards, which in most cases do come with dividend protection, have supplanted stock options as the primary form of performance-based pay at
publicly traded corporations.' 05 While stock options accounted for 60% of
the compensation paid to top executives in a sample of S&P companies in
2000, they accounted for only 17% of senior-executive pay in 2013.106
Meanwhile, non-option-based stock compensation rose from 10% to
42%.'07 One observer has gone so far as to argue that stock options were
"on the verge of extinction" by 2013.108 So while stock options may have
played a role in the initial shift from cash dividends to buybacks, they do
not appear to account for the continuation and acceleration of that trend.
A third factor contributing to the rise of share repurchases-in addition to the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor and the shift toward stock options-is
the dramatic decline in transaction costs of buying and selling stocks. The
average commission per share traded on the New York Stock Exchange
fell from approximately $0.25 in 1980 to well below $0.05 by the early
2000s.1 09 This trend is attributable both to technological advances and to
an increase in price competition among brokers following the SEC's 1975

which reduces the exercise price, only benefits the holder in the event of exercise, so the protection
would disqualify the options as performance-based under section 162.

104.
See Emily Chasan, Last Gasp for Stock Options? WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2013),
https://www.proquest.com/docview/1941733546 [https://perma.cc/W9QC-QASA].
105.

See Kristina Minnick & Leonard Rosenthal, Stealth Compensation:Do CEOs In-

crease TheirPaybylnfluencingDividendPolicy?,25 J. CORP. FIN. 435 (2014); CEOandExecutive
Compensation Practices, CONF. BOARD 17 (2019), https://conference-board.org/pdfdownload.cfm?masterProductID=20236 [https://perma.cc/5GJP-AWL8].
106.
David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: UnderstandingandEvaluating Perfor-

mance-BasedExecutive Pay, 1 J.L. FIN. & AccT. 395, 396 (2016).
107.
Id
108.

109.

Chasan, supra note 104.

Sam Ro, Average Commission perShare vs. Trading Volume, Bus. INSIDER (Apr.
21, 2015, 7:04 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/average-commission-per-share-on-nyse-vsvolume-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/MG8L-SQ39]; see also Michael A. Goldstein, Paul Irvine, Eugene Kandel & Zvi Wiener, Brokerage Commissions and InstitutionalTradingPatterns, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 5175, 5179 fig.1 (2009) (showing the decline in institutional investor average cents-pershare commission from 1977 to 2004, dropping from above twelve cents per share to little over
four cents per share).
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abolition of fixed-rate brokerage commissions." 0 The decline in transaction costs makes it easier for investors to generate "homemade dividends"
by selling shares when they desire liquidity. The availability of homemade
dividends, in turn, makes cash dividends less attractive. Note, though, that
the same development allows shareholders who do not desire liquidity to
reinvest dividends at lower cost-thus reducing the disadvantageof dividends for some shareholders. The increasing popularity of dividend-reinvestment plans-which allow a corporation's shareholders to purchase additional shares with dividends directly from the company without
commission-has done the same."' Thus, the causal relationship between
the decline in transaction costs and the rise in buybacks is not crystal clear.
Interestingly, the rise in buybacks relative to cash dividends does not
appear to be a function of changes in tax rules that make buybacks more
attractive. If anything, the tax advantage of buybacks relative to dividends
is smaller today than it once was. From 1954 until 1986 and again from 1990
to 2003,412 dividends were taxed at a higher rate than long-term capital
gains, thus adding a rate advantage to the deferral advantage of buybacks.
Moreover, the tax advantage of deferral increases with the nominal interest rate, which is lower today than at most points in the past half-century."13
Finally, the advent and expansion of IRAs and similar tax-preferred savings vehicles have created newer and larger opportunities for Americans
to hold corporate stock in accounts that neutralize the tax disadvantage of
4

dividends."

The December 2017 tax law does appear to have contributed to the
recent buyback boom, but not because it increased the tax advantage of
buybacks relative to dividends (it did not). Rather, the December 2017 law
allowed U.S. corporations to repatriate earnings from offshore subsidiaries
at no incremental tax cost, freeing up funds for corporate distributions of
all sorts."

110.

5

This development may-as will be discussed in Part III-

See, e.g., Vartanig G. Varian, Market Place: Those Discount Stockbrokers, N.Y.

TIMES (Jan. 19, 1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/19/business/market-placevartanig-g-var-

tan-those-discount-stockbrokers.html [https://perma.cc/A33V-LM42].
111.
See The DRIP Answer Report, DRIP INVESTOR, https://www.dripinvestor.com/dripanswer_report.asp [https://perma.cc/MR7F-Y3YS] (noting that more than 1,100
companies have dividend-reinvestment plans).
112.
On the history of dividend taxation, see JAMES G. GRAVELLE & MOLLY F.
SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43418, THE TAXATION OF DIVIDENDS: BACKGROUND
AND OVERVIEW 17-19 app. A (2014). On the history of capital gains taxation, see HistoricalCapital Gains and Taxes, TAX POL'Y CTR. (May 4, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-capital-gains-and-taxes [https://perma.cc/KYV6-9FJX].
113.
InterestRates, DiscountRate for UnitedStates, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Aug.

24, 2020), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INTDSRUSM193N [https://perma.cc/ALB6-WPK7].
114.
See Rosenthal & Burke, supra note 68, at 14 (estimating that 37% of U.S. company
stock is held in tax-exempt or tax-preferred accounts).
115.
See Anne Marie Knott, Why the Tax Cuts andJobs Act (TCJA) Led to Buybacks
Rather
Than
Investment,
FORBES
(Feb.
21,
2019),
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provide a new impetus for changes to the Internal Revenue Code that level
the playing field between buybacks and cash dividends, but the buyback
advantage has long been embedded in U.S. tax law.
II. Chirelstein's Proposal
Given that the buyback boom of the 1980s was still more than a decade off, Professor Chirelstein's proposal in 1969 to level the tax playing
field between buybacks and cash dividends was arguably an idea before its
time. Chirelstein's interest in the topic was likely piqued by a buyback
boomlet in the early to mid-1960s-his first footnote notes that corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange paid out more than $1.3 billion to repurchase shares in 1963.116 But to put that figure in perspective,
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange paid out approximately
$13 billion in cash dividends that same year," 7 so even during the buyback
boomlet, repurchases constituted less than tenth of corporate cash distributions by New York-listed firms.
While the buyback boomlet of the 1960s was little more than a blip by
the standards of later years, Chirelstein nonetheless perceived the differential tax treatment of buybacks and cash dividends to be a tax policy problem. To address this problem, Chirelstein suggested that all cash distributions by publicly traded corporations be treated like cash dividends.
Chirelstein's basic insight was that every buyback can be redescribed asand taxed as -a cash dividend followed by a sale of shares from redeeming
shareholders to nonredeeming shareholders.
In this part, we introduce Chirelstein's proposal through a series of
illustrations. We then discuss a number of complications and implementation challenges. We conclude the Part by examining Chirelstein's justifications for his approach.
A. The Basics
Chirelstein's proposal is perhaps easiest to understand by way of example. Recall again Examples 1 and 2 above, which we reprint here for
easy reference:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/annemarieknott/2019/02/21/why-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-tcj a-ledto-buybacks-rather-than-investment [https://perma.cc/JV38-GAVC].
116.
See Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 739 n.1.
117.
Peter L. Elkovich, 1963 Trading Volume Highest in History of Stock Exchange,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/01/archives/1963-trading-volumehighest-in-history-of-stock-exchange.html [https://perma.cc/X74E-BXGZ] (noting the NYSE's
market capitalization of $405 billion at the end of 1963); Dividend Yield of Common Stocks on
the New York Stock Exchange, Composite Index for UnitedStates, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis

(Aug.
20,
2012),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1346BUSM156NNBR
[https://perma.cc/LN8A-BHSJ] (showing an aggregate dividend yield of 3.13% for NYSE companies in December 1963).
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Example 1. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by repurchasing 50
shares. A chooses to redeem all 50 of her shares; B chooses not to redeem.
The total cost of the buyback to ChirelsteinCorp is $100; A receives $100
and B receives zero; and the value of each ChirelsteinCorp share remains
$2. Bnow owns all 50 outstanding shares of ChirelsteinCorp, which is worth

$100.
Example 2. ChirelsteinCorp issues 100 shares for $1 each. A and B each
buy 50 shares. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $100 in profits, which causes the
value of each share to rise from $1 to $2 (assuming that market value equals
book value). ChirelsteinCorp thereafter decides to distribute its $100 of
earnings to its shareholders. ChirelsteinCorp does so by issuing a cash dividend of $1 per share, causing the value of each share to fall from $2 back to
$1. Afterwards, Buses the $50 she has received through the cash dividend
to purchase A's 50 shares. B now owns all 100 outstanding shares of ChirelsteinCorp, which is worth $100.

Chirelstein would treat Example 1 the same as Example 2. That is, he
would treat Example 1 as if the corporation had paid a cash dividend of $1
per share, causing the value of each share to decline by $1, and then the
nonredeeming shareholder had purchased the redeeming shareholder's
stake. A and B would each have $50 of dividend income, on which they
would owe tax. A would owe no capital gains tax because the sale price ($1
per share) is equal to her basis. B would now have basis of $100, reflecting
the amount that she paid for her own shares plus the amount that she is
deemed to have paid to A for A's shares.

Table 4. Tax Consequences of Buybacks vs. DividendsStatus Quo vs. Chirelstein Proposal
A
B
Example 1
50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

-50 shares x $2
0

50 shares x $2

Status

Taxable Dividends
Taxable CapitalGains
UnrealizedCapital
Gains

-

InitialHoldings
After Corp Earns$100
Profits
$100 Buyback
FinalHoldings

Quo

$0
50 shares x ($2 - $1) =
$50
$0

$0

0
50 shares x ($2 - $1)
= $50
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$50
=

100 shares x ($1
$1) = $0

-

UnrealizedCapital
Gains

$50
50 shares x ($1 - $1)
$0
$0

-

Taxable Dividends
Taxable CapitalGains

Example 2
50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $1

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $1

-50 shares x $1

+50 shares x $1

0
$50
50 shares x ($1 - $1)
$0
$0

100 shares x $1
$50
=

100 shares x ($1
$1) = $0

-

UnrealizedCapital
Gains

50 shares x $1
50 shares x $2

-

InitialHoldings
After Corp Earns$100
Profits
$100 Dividend
HoldingsPost-Dividend
Post-DividendPurchase/Sale
FinalHoldings
Taxable Dividends
Taxable CapitalGains

Two more examples may reinforce the point:
Example 3. ChirelsteinCorp has 100 shares of stock outstanding, with five
investors (A, B, C, D, and E) each owning 20 shares. The value of each share
is $0.80, and each shareholder's basis is zero. ChirelsteinCorp then earns
$20, causing the value of each share to rise to $1. ChirelsteinCorp uses its
$20 of earnings to repurchase shares. Only A elects to participate in the
buyback, and she chooses to redeem all of her shares at $1 per share.

Under current law, the transaction would be treated as the disposition
of a capital asset by A, with A paying capital gains tax on $20, which is the
difference between her amount realized ($20) and her basis ($0). Under
Chirelstein's proposal, the transaction would be broken down into two
steps. At step one, the corporation would pay a cash dividend of $0.20 per
share to A, B, C, D, and E. Assuming that each shareholder holds her
shares in a taxable account, each would owe a tax at the dividend rate on
$4 (i.e., $0.20 per share times 20 shares), and the value of each share would
decline by $0.20. At step two, A would be treated as if she had sold all of
her shares for $0.80 per share. She would thus owe capital gains tax on $16
(i.e., the sale price of $0.80 per share minus her basis of $0.00 per share,
multiplied by 20 shares). B, C, D, and Ewould each acquire five new shares
of ChirelsteinCorp stock from A with a basis of $0.80 per share. The result
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is that each of these shareholders end up with a total of $4 basis in their
shares (up from $0). Thus, under Chirelstein's proposal, A ends ups with
$4 of dividend income and $16 of capital gain, in contrast with $20 of capital
gain under current law. Each of B, C, D, and Eends up with $4 of dividend
income and a $4 basis increase, while under current law they would experience no immediate tax consequences or basis adjustment.
Example 4. ChirelsteinCorp has 100 shares of stock outstanding, with five
investors (A, B, C, D, and E) each owning 20 shares. The value of each share
is $0.90, and all shares have a basis of zero. ChirelsteinCorp then earns $10,
causing the value of each share to rise to $1. ChirelsteinCorp uses its $10 of
earnings to repurchase shares. Only A elects to participate in the buyback,
and she chooses to redeem 10 of her shares at $1 per share.

Again, current law would treat the transaction as the disposition of a
capital asset by A, with A paying capital gains tax on $10, which is the
amount realized ($10) minus her zero basis. Chirelstein would separate the
transaction into (i) the payment of a cash dividend of $0.10 per share to all
shareholders, which causes the value of each share to decline by $0.10, followed by (ii) the sale by A of 10 shares at a price of $0.90 per share. All
five shareholders would recognize dividend income of $0.10 per share ($2
total). A would owe capital gains tax on $9, which is equal to a sale price
of $0.90 per share minus basis of zero multiplied by 10 shares. She would
now hold 10 shares with a value of $0.90 per share and a basis of zero, for
an unrealized gain of $9 going forward. B, C, D, and E would each acquire
2.5 new shares from A with a basis of $0.90 per share, or $2.25 in total.
Each would now hold 22.5 shares with a value of $0.90 per share ($20.25
total) and a basis of $0.90 in 2.25 of those shares ($2.25 total). Each would
thus have a total unrealized gain of $18 going forward.
Two aspects of this redescription are somewhat inelegant. First, the
redescribed transaction leaves the corporation with a different number of
outstanding shares than it actually has. Thus, we have redescribed the
transaction in Example 4 as if B, C, D, and E had each purchased 2.25
shares from A, when in fact, A's shares were redeemed and cancelled. Second, in the redescribed transaction, the corporation has a different share
price than it actually has. Thus, in Example 4, the redescription imagines
that the corporation's share price falls from $1 per share to $0.90, when in
fact, the corporation's shares would continue to trade for $1.
The easiest way to smooth over this inelegance is to adjust the basis
of all shares by the amount of the imputed dividend, and otherwise to respect real-world share cancellations and price changes. Though Chirelstein
does not explicitly adopt this approach, his analysis appears to assume it.118

118.
See Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 752-53 (explaining, in an example, that the nonredeemers' aggregate basis would simply be increased by the deemed dividend).
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Thus, in Example 4, after taxing each shareholder on an imputed dividend
of $0.10 per share, we would adjust each shareholder's basis upward by
$0.10. The redeeming shareholder (A) would have a capital gain of $1 per
share minus her new basis of $0.10 per share, multiplied by 10, for a total
of $9. Shares that are redeemed and cancelled could be treated as such, so
A would now hold 10 shares and B, C, D, and Ewould each hold 20. Each
shareholder would have a basis of $0.10 per share going forward. A would
thus have an unrealized gain going forward of $9 (i.e., a share price of $1
per share minus a basis of $0.10 per share, multiplied by 10 shares). B, C,
D, and E each would have an unrealized gain of $18 going forward (i.e., a
share price of $1 per share minus a basis of $0.10 per share, multiplied by
20 shares).119
A more technical accounting of the recharacterized transaction (i.e.,
distributions of cash to all shareholders followed by purchases of redeemed
shares) would give the newly acquired shares of B, C, D, and E a fair market value basis, while their old shares' basis would be unaffected. Broadly
speaking, the basis-adjustment approach we recommend is consistent with
this more precise accounting of the transaction because each shareholder's
overall stock basis is the same regardless. 2 0
In general, the basis-adjustment approach will put nonredeeming
shareholders at a (sometimes slight) disadvantage relative to a scenario in
which the corporation actually pays a dividend and some shareholders use
the dividend to acquire stock from others. To illustrate, recall again Example 3:
Example 3. ChirelsteinCorp has 100 shares of stock outstanding, with five
investors (A, B, C, D, and E) each owning 20 shares. The value of each share
is $0.80, and each shareholder's basis is zero. ChirelsteinCorp then earns
$20, causing the value of each share to rise to $1. ChirelsteinCorp uses its
$20 of earnings to repurchase shares. Only A elects to participate in the
buyback, and she chooses to redeem all of her shares at $1 per share.

If the corporation had simply distributed a dividend of $0.20 per share
and B, C, D, and E each had used their dividend to purchase five shares of
stock from A, the value of each share would be $0.80, the nonredeeming
shareholders would each hold 25 shares (their original 20 plus the 5 purchased from A), and each would have a fair market value basis in the shares
bought from A. If one of the nonredeeming shareholders (say, B) then
chose to liquidate $4 of her holdings, she could choose to sell the five shares
with fair market value basis and pay a capital gains tax of zero. She would

119.
The effect is that of a reverse stock split. In Example 4, there would be a 4:5 stock
split. Reverse stock splits are tax-free, and the basis of the canceled shares are added to the basis

of the remaining shares. See I.R.C.
120.
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See Yale, supra note 19, at 352-53 (noting this distinction).
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then have $16 of unrealized gains going forward ($0.80 per share multiplied
by 20 shares).
If the corporation bought back A's shares, then the basis-adjustment
approach would respect the fact that B, C, D, and E actually own only 20
shares with a value of $1 per share, and it would adjust the basis of each
share from zero to $0.20. If B then chose to liquidate $4 of her holdings,
she would sell four shares and pay capital gains tax on $3.20 (an amount
realized of $1 per share minus a basis of $0.20 per share, multiplied by 4
shares), and she would have $12.80 of unrealized gains going forward
($0.80 per share multiplied by 16 remaining shares). She would have lost
the ability to cherry-pick among shares so as to defer capital gains tax.'

Table 5. Tax Consequences of BuybacksStatus Quo vs. Precise Accounting vs. Basis Adjustment
A
B
C
D
E
Example 3

Taxable
Dividends
Taxable
Capital
Gains
Unrealized
Capital
Gains

20
x
20
x

shares
$0.80
shares
$1.00

-20 shares
x $1.00
0

$0
20 shares
x
($1 - $0)
= $20
$0

20
x
20
x

shares
$0.80
shares
$1.00

20
x
20
x

-

20 shares
x $1.00
Status
$0

shares
$0.80
shares
$1.00
-

20 shares
x $1.00

20
x
20
x

shares
$0.80
shares
$1.00
-

20
x
20
x

shares
$0.80
shares
$1.00
-

Initial
Holdings
After Corp
Earns$20
Profits
$20Buyback
Final
Holdings

20 shares
x $1.00

20 shares
x $1.00

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$20

$20

$20

$20

Quo

121.
In other cases, the basis-adjustment approach could benefit nonredeemers. For example, in the case of an actual dividend reinvestment, the holding period for the newly purchased
shares would begin upon purchase, meaning that if those shares were sold for a gain within a year,
the gain would be characterized as a short-term capital gain (and taxed at ordinary rates). Under
the basis-adjustment approach, by contrast, the shareholder could sell within a year of the redemption and potentially claim a long-term capital gain (taxed at preferential rates).
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Precise Accounting

Taxable
Dividends
Taxable
Capital
Gains

Unrealized
Capital
Gains

20 shares
x $0.20
= $4
$0

20 shares
x $0.20
= $4
$0

20 shares
x $0.20
= $4
$0

20 shares
x ($0.80 $0)+5
shares x
($0.80 -

20 shares
x ($0.80 $0)+5
shares x
($0.80 -

20 shares
x ($0.80 $0)+5
shares x
($0.80 -

20 shares
x ($0.80
$0)+5
shares x
($0.80

$0.80)

$0.80)

$0.80)

$0.80)

= $16

= $16

20 shares
x $0.20
= $4
$0

20 shares
x $0.20
= $4
$0

20 shares
x ($1.00 $0.20)
= $16

20 shares
x ($1.00
$0.20)
= $16

= $16
= $16
Basis-Adjustment Approach
20 shares
20 shares 20 shares
x $0.20
x $0.20
x $0.20
= $4
= $4
= $4
20 shares
$0
$0
x
($1
$0.20)
= $16
20 shares 20 shares
$0
x ($1.00 - x ($1.00 $0.20)
$0.20)
= $16
= $16

-

-

-

Unrealized
Capital
Gains

20 shares
x $0.20
= $4
$0

-

Taxable
Capital
Gains

20 shares
x $0.20
= $4
20 shares
x ($0.80
$0)
= $16
$0

-

Taxable
Dividends

Table 6. Tax Consequences of BuybacksStatus Quo vs. Precise Accounting vs. Basis Adjustment
A
B
C
D
E
Example 4
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20
x
20
x

shares
$0.90
shares
$1.00
-

20 shares
x $1.00

20
x
20
x

shares
$0.90
shares
$1.00
-

20 shares
x $1.00

20
x
20
x

shares
$0.90
shares
$1.00
-

20 shares
x $1.00

20
x
20
x

shares
$0.90
shares
$1.00
-

Initial
20 shares
Holdings
x $0.90
After Corp 20 shares
Earns$10
x $1.00
Profits
-20 shares
$10Buyback
x $1.00
Final
0
Holdings

20 shares
x $1.00
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Taxable
$0
Dividends
Taxable
20 shares
x ($1 - $0)
Capital
= $20
Gains
$0
Unrealized
Capital

Status
$0

Quo
$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$20

$20

$20

$20

Precise Accounting
20 shares 20 shares
x $0.10
x $0.10
= $2
= $2
$0
$0

20 shares
x $0.10
= $2
$0

20 shares
x $0.10
= $2
$0

20 shares
x ($0.90 $0) + 2.5
shares x
($0.90 -

20 shares
x ($0.90 $0) + 2.5
shares x
($0.90 -

20 shares
x ($0.90 $0) + 2.5
shares x
($0.90 -

20 shares
x ($0.90
$0) + 2.5
shares x
($0.90

$0.90)

$0.90)

$0.90)

$0.90)

= $18

= $18

20 shares
x $0.10
=$2
$0

20 shares
x $0.10
=$2
$0

20 shares
x ($1.00 $0.10)
= $18

20 shares
x ($1.00
$0.10)
= $18

Gains

Taxable
Capital
Gains
Unrealized
Capital
Gains

= $18
= $18
Basis-Adjustment Approach
20 shares
20 shares 20 shares
x $0.10
x $0.10
x $0.10
=$2
=$2
=$2
20 shares
$0
$0
x ($0.90
$0) = $18
$0
20 shares 20 shares
x ($1.00 - x ($1.00 $0.10)
$0.10)
= $18
= $18

-

-

-

Taxable
Dividends

-

Taxable
Capital
Gains
Unrealized
Capital
Gains

20 shares
x $0.10
= $2
20 shares
x ($0.90
$0) = $18
$0

-

Taxable
Dividends

Chirelstein suggested that his proposal should apply to public companies but not to closely held private firms. He thought that the "basic legislative aim" of the Code provisions governing buybacks and dividends was
"to bear lightly on withdrawals" from "closely-held or family-owned corporations"-and in his view, that aim should be respected. 22 Chirelstein
was writing well before the advent of the limited liability company (LLC)

122.

Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 750.
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and the significant liberalization of the S corporation limitations, so many
closely held businesses were then organized as C corporations. Now, however, the overwhelming majority of closely held businesses are organized
as pass-throughs.1 23 Likewise, Chirelstein was writing before the privateequity boom of the late twentieth century made it relatively easy for public
companies to raise capital from other sources and remove their shares from
stock exchanges-and well before "unicorn" start-ups such as Uber and
Airbnb achieved multibillion-dollar valuations before going to public equity markets.
In the current climate, we think that a public/nonpublic distinction
would be unwise, as it could encourage public companies seeking to go private or private companies staying private to achieve a more favorable tax
regime. And due to the popularity of flow-through structures for closely
held businesses, concerns about taxing withdrawals from those businesses
are vastly mitigated. We will therefore proceed on the assumption that
Chirelstein's proposal would apply to all corporations under subchapter C,
whether or not their shares are publicly traded.
As will soon be apparent, we believe that Chirelstein's proposal-with
the above-mentioned modifications-represents an ingenious solution to a
difficult and important tax policy problem. Yet Chirelstein's explanation
of his proposal is vulnerable to criticism on two fronts. First, Chirelstein
never addresses the administrative, compliance, and political challenges
that his proposal would entail. Second, while Chirelstein argues at some
length that buybacks and cash dividends are economically equivalent, he

123.
Some closely held organizations are still formed as C corporations. Some professional associations are organized as C corporations and "zero out" all of their income through
compensation paid to the owner-employees. These organizations will be unaffected by the proposal because they do not have earnings and profits and do not make distributions. In addition,
start-ups that seek venture-capital financing are often formed as C corporations. See generally
Gregg D. Polsky, Explaining the Choice-of-Entity Decisions by Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 409 (2019) (discussing how lawyers commonly recommend C-corporation structures to their start-up clients). These start-ups typically generate large losses while they are private.
The vast majority fail, while the successful ones often go public or are acquired by a public company within their first decade. See id at 428. Occasionally, a successful start-up will linger as a
private company for more than a decade. The proposal will generally not affect start-ups because
they do not earn profits and, if they do, they reinvest those profits. If and when they start earning
and distributing profits, they often will be a public company (or a subsidiary of one).
Closely held businesses organized as C corporations before the advent of the LLC will, in
some cases, retain the C corporation form because tax rules make conversions of profitable C
corporations to LLCs quite costly. See id at 414 (noting that tax reclassifications of C corporations
to LLCs and other tax partnerships are often financially infeasible because they require deemed
or actual liquidations of the C corporation, which triggers immediate double taxation). One possibility would be to implement a grandfather rule that would exempt C corporations formed prior
to 1998 (when the check-the-box regulations were finalized) if they have 100 or fewer shareholders
(the threshold for S corporation status today). Note, though, that shareholders of closely held corporations generally have influence over firm payout policies, and so if buybacks generate liquidity
problems for those shareholders, they can have their corporations distribute cash through dividends instead.
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never explains why the appropriate tax policy response to this economic
equivalence is to tax buybacks the same way that we currently tax cash
dividends (rather than taxing cash dividends the same way we currently tax
buybacks).
B. Implementation Challenges
One challenge in implementing Chirelstein's proposal involves the application of taxes on cash dividends to nonredeeming shareholders whoin reality-received no cash. This is sometimes called the "phantom income" problem.' Recall that under Chirelstein's proposal, nonredeeming
shareholders are deemed to have received cash dividends and then to have
reinvested those dividends in the corporation. So what if the nonredeeming
shareholders do not have the cash to pay the tax they now owe?
As noted above, although Chirelstein limited his proposal to public
companies, applying his proposal to public companies but not to other C
corporations backed by private equity would create strong incentives for
firms to leave public markets. Nevertheless, the primary impact of our proposal will be on public companies. For public-company shareholders, there
generally will not be substantial liquidity issues for U.S. shareholders because they can easily sell or borrow against their shares to pay the tax. Selling a small percentage of public-company shares to approximate the cash
flow of dividends is already a popular investment strategy. If necessary,
these so-called "homemade dividends" can be used to pay the tax.
On the other hand, the liquidity issue is trickier in the context of foreign investors -nonresident aliens and foreign corporations - who are subject to a tax of up to 30% on dividends paid by U.S. corporations. Under
current law, the federal government collects this tax by requiring domestic
corporations to withhold dividend payments to foreign investors at the
source and then to remit those amounts to the IRS.m' But how would withholding work when no cash dividend is actually paid? And if those foreign
investors have no other assets in the United States, then how can the
United States collect the tax that is due on imputed dividends?
One possibility is that U.S. corporations might respond to the Chirelstein proposal by switching entirely from buybacks to cash dividends. After
all, while the taxation of shareholders who lack the liquidity to pay the tax
poses a headache for the IRS, it is a headache for those shareholders as
well. If some shareholders want to dispose of their interests and others
want to increase their ownership percentage, then they can transact among

124.

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case fora DividendDeduction,

65 TAx L. 3, 8 (2011).
125.
See I.R.C.

§ 1441

(2018) (requiring withholding at the source by U.S. persons with

respect to dividends and other fixed and determinable income items paid to non-U.S. persons).
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each other rather than directly with the corporation. As noted above, corporations potentially would have an incentive to pay dividends, which
shareholders who want to remain invested in the corporation could use to
buy stock from shareholders who want to liquidate-thereby allowing the
remaining shareholders to take a fair market value basis in some of their
shares.1 26

Another possibility is that corporations -either by their own volition
or by legal mandate-could pay a cash dividend of at least $0.43 for every
$1 they expend on buybacks. The reason why we choose $0.43 (or rather,
.3/0.7, which rounds up to 0.43) is that the highest U.S. tax rate on dividends
paid by domestic corporations is the 30% tax on dividends paid to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations in jurisdictions that have not entered
into a tax treaty modifying the default rate. If a corporation pays a cash
dividend of $0.43 for every $1 it spends on buybacks, then a nonredeeming
shareholder will owe tax on $1.43. Applying a 30% rate to $1.43 results in
a tax liability of $0.43 (or, without rounding, $0.429). By withholding the
entire cash dividend from foreign investors in nontreaty jurisdictions,'1 27
U.S. corporations can ensure that withholding obligations are satisfied.1 28
To illustrate, consider again Example 3. The corporation chooses to
distribute its $20 of earnings ($0.20 per share). Imagine that instead of returning all of that cash through dividends or all via buybacks, the corporation pays a cash dividend of $0.06 per share ($6 total, or 30 percent of $20)
and buys back shares worth $14. Again, A elects to participate in the buyback, and she redeems 14 shares at a price of $1 per share. Under Chirelstein's proposal, A, B, C, D, and E each would report as income the $0.06
per share cash dividend and the $0.14 per share imputed dividend, or $0.20
per share in total. If one of the nonredeeming shareholders is a nonresident
alien or foreign corporation in a nontreaty jurisdiction, she will owe tax of
30% times $0.20 per share, or $0.06 per share, which is equal to the amount

126.
As mentioned above, many corporations already have dividend reinvestment plans
(DRIPs) in effect, and one might think that, if the proposal were enacted, these might be used to
adjust ownership percentages. See supra notes 43, 48, 111 and accompanying text. The shares issued through these plans are often treasury shares, which are acquired by companies through buybacks, though corporations could also issue new shares to satisfy DRIP demand.
127.
Because all shareholders of the same class must be treated alike, the 43-cent cash
dividend would have to be paid on all shares, not just those owned by foreign shareholders. While
a foreign shareholder's 43-cent dividend would be subject to withholding (and the 30% rate would
be entirely withheld), for other shareholders, the dividend would be paid in full to the shareholder.
In essence, the 43-cent cash dividend solution would result in the corporation distributing no more
than 57% of its annual distributions to a class of stock in the form of redemptions.
128.
Another, less intrusive, approach would be to allow the company to sell a portion
of a nonredeeming foreign shareholder's shares to satisfy the withholding tax obligation. This approach would effectively mandate the participation of foreigners in a buyback to the extent necessary to pay the withholding tax. The foreigner could then, if it wished, purchase shares on the
open market to restore its ownership percentage back to the status quo prior to the mandated sale.
A significant practical problem with this approach is that it would treat foreigner shareholders and
domestic shareholders disparately, which could violate existing tax-treaty rules.
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of the cash dividend. The U.S. corporation can satisfy its withholding obligations by remitting all of the foreign investor's cash dividends to the IRS.
Our own view is that a legal requirement that corporations pay $0.43
in cash dividends for every $1 of share buybacks would fully neutralize the
phantom income objection to Chirelstein's proposal. More precisely, the
requirement would be that the ratio of cash dividends to buybacks be equal
to t/(1 - t), where t represents the highest applicable tax rate on dividends.
While such a requirement would constrain corporations in their choice of
form for cash distributions, the constraint seems minor given that every
economic outcome that can be achieved through buybacks also can be attained through a mix of buybacks and cash dividends.
A more heavy-handed approach would be to outlaw buybacks entirely, thereby requiring that nonliquidating corporate distributions always
be accomplished through cash dividends. This would eliminate all liquidity
concerns and would be straightforward to administer. It is also consistent
with Chirelstein's fundamental insight that, leaving aside tax consequences, buybacks and dividends are economically equivalent. Nevertheless, outlawing buybacks could have profound repercussions in other contexts. For example, while option compensation is losing popularity, it still
exists, and section 409A effectively forecloses dividend protection. Absent
amendment to section 409A, outlawing buybacks would make optionbased compensation much less attractive because the value of a manager's
options would decline every time the corporation distributes cash to shareholders. For critics of stock option-based compensation, this outcome may
be a feature rather than a bug.1 29 It is, however, an outcome that Congress
should consider directly rather than generating as an accidental byproduct
of a tax policy change.
A second-and similarly soluble-challenge in implementing Chirelstein's proposal relates to basis tracking.130 In the normal course, a

129.
See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J.
ECON. PERSP. 49, 60 (2003).
130.
This concern (and the related concern of requiring shareholders to report imputed
dividends) formed the basis for William Andrews's recommendation that, in lieu of the Chirelstein
proposal, Congress should impose a corporate excise tax on redemptions. See AM. LAW INST.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS

AND DISPOSITIONS 472-73 (1982). The corporate excise-tax rate would equal the average effective
shareholder-level tax rate on corporate dividends. Andrews acknowledged that the Chirelstein
approach would yield a more exact equivalence between dividends and buybacks. Id at 472. Andrews's excise tax would undertax (relative to a dividend baseline) repurchases by firms whose
continuing shareholders were in high brackets and would over-tax (relative to the dividend baseline) repurchases by firms whose continuing shareholders were predominantly tax-exempt or lowbracket taxpayers. Id at 473. Andrews nevertheless preferred the excise tax primarily for its relative simplicity. Id However, as explained in the text, brokers are now required to report stock
basis amounts to their clients and to the IRS thereby dramatically easing the compliance burdens
noted by Andrews. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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shareholder's adjusted basis in stock is simply the purchase price plus the
cost of purchase (e.g., brokerage commissions).131 Under our basis-adjust-

ment version of Chirelstein's proposal, a shareholder would take an upward basis adjustment equal to the amount of any imputed cash dividend.
The reason for the basis adjustment is to reflect the fact (or perhaps more
accurately, the fiction) that the shareholder has received the cash dividend
and reinvested that amount in the corporation. So when a taxpayer ultimately sells her shares (assuming no step-up in basis along the way), she
will have to know not only how much she paid for the shares (plus commissions), but also how much she has recognized as imputed dividend income since then.1 32

This additional element in the basis calculus will complicate tax compliance marginally. We do not expect, however, that the compliance burden will be any more than marginal. Existing law requires tracking of stock
splits, spinoffs, and mergers. Brokers have been required to track and report their customers' basis in equities since 2011.133 Several automated basis tracking programs allow brokers to comply with these reporting

In a similar vein, George Yin in 1990 proposed a corporate distributions tax, which would
be paid by the corporation whenever it made distributions, regardless of the form of the distribution. See George K. Yin, A DifferentApproach to the Taxation of CorporateDistributions:Theory and Implementation of a Uniform Corporate-Level Distributions Tax, 78 GEO. L.J. 1837
(1990). Yin's approach would represent a more sweeping reform measure than either the Andrews
or the Chirelstein proposals because Yin would tax all distributions the same regardless of the tax
status of the shareholder. Andrews would continue to take into account shareholder tax status for
dividend distributions (but not for repurchases), while Chirelstein would continue to take into
account shareholder tax status for both dividends and repurchases. Chirelstein's more nuanced
treatment of dividends and repurchases is more significant now than at the time of the Andrews
and Yin proposals due to the recent growth of tax-exempt ownership of public-company stock,
which is now estimated to total more than 40% of market capitalization. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
To be clear, our argument here is not that Chirelstein's approach is "better" than Andrews's
or Yin's on the basis of first principles. Andrews's approach would effectively eliminate the benefit
of shareholder-level income-tax exemptions with respect to repurchases from the perspective of
pension plans, IRAs, and nonprofit-institution shareholders. Yin's approach would effectively
eliminate the benefit of shareholder-level income-tax exemptions with respect to repurchases and
dividends from those shareholders' perspective. Yin, supra, at 1871-77. Whether that is an advantage or disadvantage depends, ultimately, on one's view of the desirability of tax exemption
for pension plans, IRAs, and nonprofit institutions. A feature of Chirelstein's approach is that it
addresses the buyback problem without upending the entire corporate and shareholder-level income tax system. See infra Section IV.C.
131.
See, e.g., FrequentlyAsked Questions:Stocks (Options, Splits, Traders), INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (July 15, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/faqs/capital-gains-losses-and-sale-ofhome/stocks-options-splits-traders/stocks-options-splits-traders-1
[https://perma.cc/D8XS-

6AGM].
132.
Basis tracking would be more complicated if, instead of adjusting basis in all shares
by the amount of the imputed dividend, nonredeeming shareholders were treated as if they had
bought a block of stock from redeeming shareholders and taken a fair market value basis in those
new shares.
133.
See JonathanHorn, The BraveNew Worldof CostBasis Reporting, J. ACC. (Sept.
1,
2013),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2013/sep/20137345.html

[https://perma.cc/WY2A-6JQC].
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requirements at modest cost.1 34 Updating these basis-tracking solutions to
include imputed dividends would not require a significant technological
leap.
A final hurdle to Chirelstein's proposal is political. As Ethan Yale
writes, "Any proponent of Chirelstein's proposal would have to conquer
the public relations difficulty that nonredeemed shareholders would be
taxed even when they chose not to sell, 'merely' because of the actions of
others."13 5 This public-relations difficulty would be mitigated somewhat by
the fact that only about a quarter of U.S. households own stock directly.'36
Individuals who hold stock in tax-preferred retirement plans or accounts
such as 401(k)s and IRAs would be unaffected because those vehicles are
exempt from any tax on dividend income.13 7 Even so, the taxation of
"phantom" income has long been thought to operate as an insuperable obstacle to proposals such as Chirelstein's that separate taxation from realization.' 38
Our suggestion that corporations be required to pay $0.43 in dividends for every $1 of buybacks would eliminate the phantom income problem entirely (given current tax rates). As tax rates change, the minimum
dividend-to-buyback ratio could change too. This modification-along
with the groundswell of antipathy toward buybacks-may give Chirelstein's proposal the political traction today that it lacked 50 years ago.
While it is too soon to say how long the current anti-buyback moment will
last, it is not impossible to think that it will last long enough to see through
changes to the buyback tax regime.

134.

See Carolyn T. Geer, New Tax Reporting Rules, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2011),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703727804576017984041795712
[https://perma.cc/R9JV-8Q4A].
135.
Yale, supra note 19, at 353. Yale noted that the same result occurs in economically
identical cases where some shareholders receive a cash dividend and others a stock dividend. See
id. In such a situation, all shareholders would receive a taxable dividend. See I.R.C. § 305(b)(2)
(2018). While this is true, it is doubtful whether this technical point will have any political salience
with either voters or policymakers.
136.
See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of US.

CorporateStock, 151 TAx NOTES 923, 926 (2016).
137.
138.

See I.R.C. § 501(a) (exempting qualified retirement accounts from taxation).
See, e.g., Clarissa Potter, Mark-to-Market Taxationas the Way to Save the Income

Tax-A FormerAdministrator'sView, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 879, 901 (1999) (arguing that individuals and politicians would exhibit "antipathy" toward "any rule that taxes income before it is realized"). On the other hand, Congress already has provided for taxation on "phantom" income in
a very similar situation. Section 305(c) authorizes Treasury regulations that would apply to
changes in conversion ratios, changes in redemption prices, differences between redemption prices
and issue prices, redemptions which are (under current law) recharacterized as distributions, and
other similar transactions. I.R.C. § 305(c) (2018). Treasury Regulation 1.305-7, promulgated pursuant to this authority, imposes tax on shareholders whose proportionate interest in the corporation is increased as a result of these transactions. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7 (1995). Like the nonredeemers under the Chirelstein approach, these shareholders are taxed on such an increase even
though they are mere bystanders to the transaction and receive no cash or other property in the
transaction. We thank Lawrence Zelenak for pointing out the section 305(c) analogy.
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C Justification
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming in Chirelstein's explanation of
his own proposal is the lack of a normative foundation for his prescription.
Chirelstein convincingly showed that "share repurchasing and ordinary
dividend payments are largely interchangeable from an economic standpoint."1 39 He did not demonstrate, however, why the differential tax treatment of buybacks and dividends is a policy problem, beyond the fact that
it arguably offends an aesthetic interest in seeing like transactions taxed
alike. If the consequence of differential taxation is that corporations
choose to distribute cash through buybacks rather than cash dividends,
then the efficiency loss is small precisely because the two forms are essentially equivalent.
Arguably, the differential taxation of buybacks and dividends violates
the principle of horizontal equity (i.e., the idea that similarly situated individuals should pay the same amount in tax) because two otherwise identical taxpayers will owe different amounts based on the cash distribution
policies of the corporations in which they own shares.14 0 But even this proposition is doubtful, because the tax efficiency of a corporation's cash-distribution policy may affect its share price. For example, if Berkshire Hathaway distributes cash via buybacks while Coca-Cola pays cash dividends,
then tax-sensitive investors will-all else equal-be willing to pay a premium for Berkshire Hathaway shares. If so, then the tax advantage of buybacks vis-a-vis cash dividends does not represent a windfall for Berkshire
Hathaway shareholders relative to their Coca-Cola-owning peers, as the
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders have effectively paid for the tax benefit
through a higher purchase price.
Insofar as the tax efficiency of a corporation's cash-distribution policy
is incorporated into its share price, then the cost of equity capital may be
lower for corporations that can credibly commit to buybacks than for corporations that cannot. This potentially could result in a misallocation of
equity capital across enterprises whose only distinguishing features are
their tax attributes-though we are skeptical that this misallocation is economically significant. The misallocation would arise if there are some firms
that are especially inclined to distribute earnings through cash dividends
rather than buybacks, and therefore cannot access equity capital on the
same terms as repurchasing firms. But in light of the economic equivalence
between buybacks and cash dividends, it is difficult to see why such a preference for cash dividends would arise.

139.
Chirelstein, supra note 16, at 741.
140.
Even if the differential treatment of buybacks and dividends can be characterized
as a violation of horizontal equity, it is not clear that we should care. For doubts about the normative relevance of horizontal equity, see Louis Kaplow, HorizontalEquity:Measures in Search of
a Principle,42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989).
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One further possibility is that the differential tax treatment of buybacks and dividends may lead firms to adopt suboptimal compensation arrangements so as to signal that their cash distributions will be tax efficient.
The idea would be as follows: Tax-sensitive shareholders (other than domestic corporations) prefer that firms distribute earnings through buybacks rather than cash dividends, but they cannot know for sure whether
firms will do so. Firms may therefore choose to compensate their managers
in dividend-unprotected stock options so as to demonstrate to potential
investors that distributions will be in buyback form. After all, if managers
hold dividend-unprotected stock options, then they have a strong incentive
to favor buybacks over cash dividends.' 4 ' Dividend-unprotected stock options may not, however, be the way those firms would choose to compensate their managers in the absence of tax considerations. The upshot is that
firms may adopt economically inefficient compensation arrangements as a
way to commit to tax-efficient earnings distributions.
While such a distortion is theoretically possible, we again are doubtful
of its magnitude. First, we are aware of no corporate-law rule that would
prohibit a company from inserting a provision into its charter or bylaws
that requires it to distribute earnings via buybacks rather than cash dividends. Thus, if a firm wants to make a credible commitment to a zero-dividend approach, it should be able to do so without adopting an inefficient
compensation scheme. Second, if a firm wants to commit to a zero-dividend approach but prefers to compensate managers in restricted stock rather than stock options, it can simply use dividend-unprotected restricted
stock units (i.e., restricted stock units that do not entitle the holder to receive dividends until the stock has vested). Thus, no firm is ever "forced"
to compensate managers in stock options rather than stock because of a
desire to signal a commitment to buybacks. The decline in the use of compensatory stock options further suggests that the tax treatment of buybacks
is not significantly skewing pay packages toward options.
Last but not least, even if the differential treatment of buybacks and
cash dividends is inherently problematic, it is unclear why the solution is to
tax buybacks like cash dividends rather than vice versa. We can achieve
parity in the taxation of buybacks and cash dividends by treating every
buyback like a cash dividend followed by a basis adjustment, but we can
just as easily achieve parity by treating every cash dividend like a buyback.
To illustrate: consider again Examples 1 and 2. In Example 1, ChirelsteinCorp buys back 50 shares from shareholder A for $2 per share; in Example
2, ChirelsteinCorp pays a dividend of $1 per share to each of its two investors (who hold 50 shares apiece), and shareholder B uses her dividend to
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Cf Jeffrey R. Brown, Nellie Liang & Scott Weisbenner, Executive FnancialIncen-

tives and PayoutPolicy: FirmResponses to 2003 Dividend Tax Cut, 62 J. FIN. 1935, 1935 (2007)
(finding that executives with greater stock awards tended to increase dividends in response to the
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buy A out. We said that the tax treatment of the buyback (Example 1) is
generally more favorable than the tax treatment of the cash dividend (Example 2) because in the buyback scenario, shareholder A pays a tax on the
buyback proceeds minus basis ($50 total), while in the cash dividend scenario, each shareholder pays tax on the full amount of the dividend ($50
per shareholder). But if the tax treatment of buybacks is not set in stone,
neither is the tax treatment of cash dividends. We could, for example, treat
the shareholders in Example 2 as if they had sold half their shares for $50
per share, thus allowing them to utilize basis ($1 per share) to offset tax on
the capital gain. More generally, a cash dividend of dpaid by a corporation
with a price per share of p could be taxed as if the shareholder had sold a
fraction (dp) of her interest, thus allowing the shareholder to utilize the
same fraction (dp) of her adjusted basis.
Ethan Yale has developed this approach in greater detail, referring to
it as the "'exchange equivalent distributions' (EED) tax."114 The EED tax
would treat all corporate distributions-whether in the form of pro rata
dividends or stock redemptions-as stock sales.1 43 The deemed seller, in
the case of dividends, would be allowed to recover the proportional
amount of her stock basis in these sales, just as the redeeming shareholder
does in a redemption. However, in contrast with the Chirelstein proposal,
nonredeemers would not face any tax consequences under the EED approach.
Both the EED tax and the Chirelstein proposal would come close to
putting dividends and repurchases on equal tax footing, the former by allowing equivalent stock basis recovery and the latter by denying any such
recovery. However, for reasons that we explain in the next Part, we believe
that Chirelstein's proposal is preferable to the EED tax on efficiency and
equity grounds-specifically because we think that nonredeeming shareholders should pay tax. The EED tax underscores, though, that the case
for Chirelstein's proposal cannot rest on the fact that it generates greater
parity in the taxation of buybacks and cash dividends. After all, Yale's
EED tax does that too-and without the potential problem of phantom
income. That Chirelstein failed to consider this alternative mechanism for
achieving parity between buybacks and cash dividends is, we think, a surprising omission but ultimately not a fatal flaw.
III. The Case for Taxing Buybacks Like Dividends
This Part evaluates the case for taxing buybacks like cash dividends.
First, we address what we think is a red herring: the argument that buybacks should be taxed like cash dividends so as to discourage buybacks for
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nontax reasons. We then move on to consider several more substantial arguments for taxing buybacks like cash dividends.
A. The Buyback Backlash
The dramatic increase in buybacks in recent years has sparked something of a "buyback backlash,"" with academics, politicians, and even
some prominent financial professionals joining the chorus of criticism. 45
The crux of the critique is two-fold: first, that buybacks divert capital from
productive investment; and second, that buybacks benefit executives at the
expense of other stakeholders.1 46 We address each point in turn.
1. Buybacks and Productive Investment
It is hard to see why buybacks -any more than economically equivalent cash dividends - divert capital from productive investment. Setting tax
considerations aside, corporate managers who seek to maximize shareholder value will distribute rather than reinvest earnings when the corporation has no available investment opportunities for which the expected
rate of return exceeds the opportunity cost of capital. Put differently, managers will distribute rather than reinvest earnings when shareholders can
do better investing that money for themselves than the corporation can do
investing on their behalf. Cash distributions-whether in the form of buybacks or dividends-are a sign that managers believe there are better investment opportunities outside the corporation than within.
It is, of course, possible that managers will systematically err in deciding when to distribute earnings and when to reinvest. But it is not obvious
that such errors will be in the direction of excessive distributions. Managers
themselves benefit from an increase in their firm's market capitalization.
The CEO of a $2 billion market-cap company is likely to command a higher
salary than the CEO of a $1 billion market-cap company. 4 7 Managers may
therefore have an incentive to retain earnings-thereby increasing the
book value and likely the market value of their firm's equity-even when
the decision that would maximize shareholder value would be to distribute
cash via buyback or dividend.
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See, e.g., Dan McCrum, The Buyback Backlash, GE as Exhibit A, FIN. TIMES:
ALPHAVILLE (Feb. 19, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/02/19/1519031430000/The-buybackbacklash--GE-as-exhibit-A [https://perma.cc/3DWS-PNGW].
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Even if one believes that corporations are too quick to distribute rather than reinvest earnings, that belief does not necessarily translate into
an argument against the current tax law status quo. Somewhat counterintuitively, the current tax treatment of buybacks may cause corporations to
retain rather than distribute earnings. The reason for this-discussed at
greater length in Section III.B-is that under current law, shareholders
may want corporations to delay distributions so that they (and their heirs)
can take advantage of the step-up in basis at death. Chirelstein's proposal
would reduce the incentive to delay nonliquidating distributions until
death because the tax on distributions, which would be treated as dividends, does not depend upon basis. If the policy objective is to discourage
cash distributions (and we consider that to be a questionable goal), then
taxing buybacks like dividends is not necessarily the right path.
Finally, we should note that the evidence in support of the claim that
buybacks are cannibalizing productive investment is quite weak. Cash returned to shareholders via buybacks does not vanish; shareholders can reinvest that cash in other enterprises. And while cash is flowing out of corporations through buybacks, it is flowing back into corporations through
new equity issuances. According to calculations by Jesse Fried and Charles
Wang, net shareholder payouts of S&P 500 firms-buybacks plus dividends minus new equity issuances-total to approximately 50% of net income during the 2007 to 2016 period (and 41% of "R&D-adjusted net income," i.e., net income with research and development expenses added
back in).1 48 That is, on an S&P 500-wide basis, $0.50 to $0.59 of every $1 of
profits earned by corporations remain within the company. Meanwhile,
cash as a percentage of total assets of S&P 500 nonfinancial firms at the
end of the third quarter of 2019 was 10%, down from highs above 12%
before the December 2017 tax law but well above the historical average of
7%.149 Corporations-at least before the COVID-19 crisis struck-were
awash in cash. All of this makes it very difficult to argue that buybacks
were at the same time depriving companies of the liquidity they needed to
pursue new projects.
2. Buybacks and Executive Compensation
The claim that buybacks benefit executives at the expense of other
corporate stakeholders is potentially-though limitedly-true if the alternative to a buyback is a cash dividend and executives hold dividend-
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John Anthers, Authers' Newsletter: Following the Money Leads to a Grim Outlook, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2019, 12:01 AM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
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unprotected stock options. An equally valid way to frame the same point
is that the choice to distribute earnings via buybacks rather than cash dividends shields executives from a hit to their compensation that is unrelated
to firm performance. Thus, while executives with compensatory stock options are generally better off when a company buys back shares rather than
paying dividends, it is difficult to describe this benefit to executives as in
any way illegitimate.
Beyond the stock option context, executives are sometimes said to
benefit from buybacks if their compensation is explicitly tied to earnings
per share (EPS). Outspoken buyback critic William Lazonick writes that
buybacks "automatically increase earnings per share (EPS) by decreasing
the number of shares outstanding.""' This claim is puzzling. Buybacks affect both the numerator and denominator of a company's earnings-pershare calculation, and it is far from automatic that the overall effect on EPS
will be positive.
To illustrate: imagine a corporation with $90 of noncash assets, $10 of
cash, no liabilities, and 100 shares outstanding. If market value equals book
value, the value of each share will be $1. Assume that the $90 of noncash
assets generate income of $4.50, reflecting a rate of return of 5%. The corporation can use its $10 of cash to invest in new projects, repurchase shares,
or pay a dividend. If the corporation reinvests the $10 of cash in a project
that yields a 5% return (i.e., $0.50), then its earnings for the year will be $5
(i.e., $4.50 plus $0.50) and its EPS will be $0.05. If the investment yields a
return of more than 5%, then EPS will be higher than $0.05. If the yield is
lower, then EPS will be lower.
What if the corporation uses the $10 of cash to buy back 10 shares of
stock at the beginning of the year? Now earnings for the year will be $4.50,
but the number of outstanding shares will be 90. EPS will thus be $0.05.
Note that $0.05 is the same EPS as if the firm had reinvested the $10 of
cash at a 5% rate of return. Only if the firm is earning less than a 5% return
on its marginal investment will buying back shares raise EPS. If the firm
would have earned more than a 5% return on its marginal investment, buying back shares will have lowered EPS. There is no alchemy here. Returning cash to shareholders when that cash otherwise would be earning a below-market return boosts profitability. Returning cash to shareholders
when that cash otherwise would be earning an above-market return reduces profitability.
Finally, if the corporation uses the $10 of cash to pay a dividend of
$0.10 per share at the beginning of the year, then its earnings for the year
will be $4.50 and its EPS will be $0.045. In this respect, the corporation can
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"inflate" its EPS by distributing cash to shareholders via buybacks rather
than dividends. But again, it is hard to characterize this aspect of buybacks
as illegitimate. It is equally valid to say that dividends artificially "deflate"
EPS and that buybacks are a way of returning cash to shareholders that is
EPS-neutral.'1'

One might think that corporations could manipulate EPS by buying
back shares at the end of a reporting period. Thus, they would be able to
invest cash (and earn positive returns) over the course of the period and
then could use that cash to buy back shares and reduce the EPS denominator at the very end. Fortunately, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board understands this problem and has crafted a definition of EPS that
addresses it. FASB requires firms following generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) to report EPS on the basis of the weighted-average
number of shares outstanding for the period. 2 Thus, if the corporation
bought back 10 shares on the last day of the year, its EPS denominator (in
a non-leap year) would be (364 days x 100 shares + 1 day x 90 shares)/365
days, or 99.97. There is no obvious EPS benefit to buying back shares at
the beginning of a period because then the company loses any yield that it
would have earned on the cash used to finance the buyback, and no obvious EPS benefit to buying back stock at the tail end because then the effect
on the weighted average number of shares is negligible.15 3
So, while it is true that buybacks almost always increase EPS relative
to dividends, they do not necessarily increase EPS relative to reinvestment.
Buybacks increase EPS relative to reinvestment if the opportunity cost of
the buyback is less than the company's earnings yield (i.e., earnings per
share divided by price). If the company in the example above could have
earned greater than a 5% return by reinvesting the $10 itself, then the
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There is, to be sure, no law against using non-GAAP measures of EPS to calculate
executive compensation, so long as the details of those measures are disclosed to shareholders.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) instruction no. 5 (2019) (requiring disclosure). We are not aware of
firms that compensate executives based on unweighted EPS metrics. But even if firms chose to do
so, that would be a weak argument for regulating buybacks. Firms likewise could-conceivablycompensate executives based on share price with no adjustment for reverse stock splits (e.g., twofor-one reverse splits that mechanically cause share price to double). That would be a silly way to
pay an executive, but it would not be obviously illegal. If it called for any regulatory action, the
solution would seem to lie in better regulation of executive compensation rather than restrictions
on reverse stock splits (or, analogously, buybacks).
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buyback effectively reduced EPS. Tying an executive's compensation to
EPS encourages buybacks only if the company lacks internal investment
opportunities that will generate returns exceeding the company's earnings
yield.114
Indeed, buybacks may ultimately have a negative effect on top executives' personal interests (relative to reinvestment). First, while buybacks
do not mechanically reduce a company's EPS, buybacks-like dividendsdo mechanically reduce the company's market capitalization (i.e., the price
of its shares multiplied by the number of outstanding shares). As noted
above, CEO compensation tends to increase in tandem with market capitalization, so in buying back shares, CEOs potentially shrink their own salaries.' 55 Second, buybacks-like dividends-reduce free cash flow. Substantial free cash flow potentially allows managers to pursue pet projects,
purchase plush corporate jets, redecorate their own offices ornately, and
so on.1 56 Distributing cash to shareholders thus may come at the expense
of executive perquisites.
Just as the effect of buybacks on executive pay is ambiguous, the effect of buybacks on workers' wages is similarly unclear. While buyback
critics often allege that share repurchases hurt workers, '1 none of these
arguments explain why buybacks are any worse than dividends in this regard, and the alternative to buybacks and dividends-retention of earnings-may be even worse. A corporation that retains earnings rather than
distributing cash to shareholders can use those retained earnings to expand
horizontally or vertically, swallowing up rivals and other enterprises in related industries. The resulting concentration of pricing power raises the
risks of labor-market monopsony and product-market monopoly, potentially allowing employers to depress wages or sellers to inflate prices.'58
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will be $4.50 if the cash remains idle. Say that the board sets an EPS target of $5 and offers a large
bonus to the CEO that is contingent upon meeting that target. By using the cash to buy back 10
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This does not necessarily mean that EPS-based performance-pay targets are ill-conceived.
Managers are often thought to be excessively risk-averse in the absence of compensation arrangements that align managerial incentives with shareholder interests. See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Motive for ConglomerateMergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981).
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None of this is to suggest that buybacks are always and everywhere
unproblematic from a policy perspective. For example, Jesse Fried has argued that managers may initiate buybacks in order to capitalize on private
information indicating that their company's shares are undervalued.1 59 Although the managers might in theory buy company stock for their own accounts, they would expose themselves to insider trading liability if they did.
Instead, they might initiate buybacks and retain their own shares, thereby
increasing their percentage stake in the corporation. While the Securities
and Exchange Commission maintains that insider-trading laws apply to
corporate-share repurchases, Fried argues that lax disclosure requirements
surrounding buybacks make "insider trading via the corporation" difficult
to detect.1 60
Fried does not suggest that all or even most buybacks result from
managers' efforts to capitalize on private information indicating undervaluation.161 To the extent that weak disclosure rules surrounding buybacks
allow executives to profit from "insider trading via the corporation," the
logical policy prescription would be-as Fried recommends-to bolster
disclosure requirements.1 62 Changing the tax treatment of buybacks in order to address the potential for corporate insider trading would be a remarkably roundabout policy response.1 63 Note also that buybacks are not
unique in their vulnerability to insider trading. Executives also can reduce
their stake in the companies they run by issuing new equity (i.e., selling
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The same could be said of the mirror-image concern that managers initiate buybacks not because they want to increase their ownership of their companies but because they want
to partially liquidate their positions. See Jesse M. Fried, Open Market Repurchases:Signaling or
ManagerialOpportunism, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 865, 885-91 (2001); Jackson, supra note
13. This theory posits that managers rely on buybacks for price and liquidity support when they
are selling their own shares. Jackson cites the fact that insider sales increase five-fold in the eight
days following a buyback announcement as evidence that executives "use [buybacks] as an opportunity to pocket some cash at the expense of the shareholders they have a duty to protect, the
workers they employ, or the communities they serve." Jackson, supra note 13.
The implications of insider sales after a buyback announcement are not so clear, however.
Recall that buybacks add risk to the portfolios of nonredeeming shareholders. In effect, the nonredeemers now hold less in cash and more in noncash assets. We would therefore expect insiders
who had optimized the cash/noncash allocation of their portfolios before a buyback to sell shares
in a buyback in order to maintain the same allocation as before. The fact that insiders sell shares
after a buyback announcement is not necessarily an indication of any foul play.
In any event, if insider sales after a buyback announcement are a policy problem, the logical
response would be to alter the rules regarding post-buyback insider trading, not to change the tax
treatment of buybacks. Indeed, redeeming shareholders are the ones leastaffected by the tax laws'
current favoritism for buybacks over dividends because redeeming shareholders do pay tax.
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new shares). Thus, new equity issuances-the polar opposite of buybacks-also allow executives to profit from insider trading via the corporation when executives have negative rather than positive inside information about firm prospects.
B. The Tax Treatment of Buybacks and the DistributionDecision
Even if one is unpersuaded by our arguments in the previous Section,
a general antipathy toward corporate cash distributions would be a weak
reason to support Chirelstein's proposal. This is because Chirelstein's proposal will not necessarily discourage-and might well accelerate-corporate distributions of cash.
To understand why, a primer on the "new view" of dividend taxation
is potentially helpful. One key insight of the new view is that a constant tax
rate on corporate cash distributions to shareholders does not affect the timing of distributions. All that matters is the relative after-tax rate of return
on investments inside and outside the corporation. To illustrate: imagine
that a corporation has $100 of retained earnings and that the tax rate on
distributions is 20%. The corporation can earn an after-tax return of 5%
by investing the $100 in new projects, and shareholders can earn an aftertax return of 5% by investing themselves. Under these circumstances,
shareholders should be indifferent as to whether the corporation distributes cash now or in the future. If the corporation distributes cash now, then
the $100 distribution will be subject to a 20% tax, leaving $80 for shareholders to invest. If shareholders invest $80 at a 5% after-tax rate of return,
they will end up with $84 next year. If instead the corporation reinvests the
$100 at a 5% after-tax rate of return, the investment will grow to $105 next
year. If the corporation distributes $105 to shareholders then, the distribution will be subject to a 20% (i.e., $21) tax, and shareholders will end up
with $84. Either way, shareholders end up in the same position ($84). The
same general logic would hold if the tax rate on distributions were any
other figure from 0 to 100%. Assuming that the after-tax rate of return is
the same inside the corporation and outside, the shareholder ultimately
ends up in the same position regardless of whether the corporation distributes earnings today or later on.
According to the new view, 164 shareholders should prefer for the corporation to retain rather than distribute earnings if the corporation's aftertax rate of return is higher than the shareholder's after-tax rate of return.
That might be the case if the corporation has access to investment opportunities unavailable to its shareholders individually, or if corporations and
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individuals have access to the same investment opportunities but the income tax rate on corporations is lower than the rate on individuals. The
latter condition exists today with respect to investments by U.S. corporations and high-bracket individuals in dividend-yielding and interest-generating assets: the corporate income tax rate is 21% (effectively half that with
respect to dividends eligible for the dividends received reduction), while
the top rate on individuals is 23.8% for long-term capital gains and qualified dividends and 40.8% for short-term capital gains, as well as ordinary
dividends and other ordinary income. By contrast, shareholders should
prefer for the corporation to distribute rather than retain earnings if the
corporation's after-tax rate of return is lower than the shareholder's aftertax rate of return. That condition plausibly exists today for pension plans,
tax-exempt institutions, and individuals investing through tax-preferred retirement accounts-all of whom face a tax rate of zero on investment income. It also potentially exists for taxable individuals investing in stocks
with low or zero-dividend yields who plan to hold their investments until
death. The effective tax rate on capital gains for those individuals is 0%,
while for corporations it is (as noted above) 21% percent.
An important caveat to the propositions in the previous paragraphs is
that taxes on distributions may distort timing if the tax rate is variable. Imagine, for example, that the tax rate on corporate cash distributions is 20%
this year but will be zero next year, and shareholders can invest at a 5%
after-tax rate of return. If the corporation distributes $100 today, then-as
illustrated above-the shareholders end up with $84 next year. If the corporation retains the $100 and reinvests it at any after-tax rate of return
higher than negative 16%, then shareholders will end up with more than
$84 next year. The expectation that the tax rate on distributions will decline
next year potentially leads the corporation to retain earnings even when
doing so is quite inefficient from a non-tax perspective.
Under certain circumstances, the current tax law's treatment of buybacks interacts with other features of the code to create an expectation of
declining tax rates on distributions. Imagine a corporation with a single
shareholder who is a taxable U.S. resident individual. Assume that the individual's basis in her shares is low relative to fair market value, so distributions in the form of dividends or buybacks both would generate substantial tax liabilities. However, if the individual holds her shares until death,
then her heirs' basis will be stepped up to fair market value and the corporation can buy back shares without triggering any capital gains-tax liability.
The shareholder may therefore want the corporation to delay distributions
even if investment opportunities inside the corporation are significantly
less attractive than investment opportunities outside. Chirelstein's
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proposal would potentially (though only partially1 65 ) offset this incentive
for delay, because the single shareholder's heirs would be taxed on distributions even if they occurred after basis step-up.1 66
To be clear: It is not our claim that Chirelstein's proposal necessarily
will accelerate distributions of corporate cash; the effects could go in either
direction.1 67 If corporations currently are retaining earnings and delaying
distributions until pivotal shareholders can benefit from stepped-up basis,
then Chirelstein's proposal would potentially accelerate distributions-the
opposite of what buyback critics appear to want. But Chirelstein's proposal
also might cause corporations to delay distributions-either because they
expect the Chirelstein regime to be temporary and want to wait it out, or
because Chirelstein's proposal would turn corporations into more attractive vehicles for holding stock relative to individual taxable accounts. We
thus cannot rule out the possibility that Chirelstein's proposal will achieve
what buyback critics apparently want (i.e., a drop in distributions), though
we cannot guarantee that outcome either.
C Buybacks and the Lock-In Problem
Chirelstein's proposal would go some way toward addressing the familiar problem of capital gains lock-in, though we do not think this is the
most powerful argument in the proposal's favor. In this Section, we first
explain the lock-in problem and then consider the ways in which Chirelstein's proposal would mitigate it but not eliminate it.
An example serves to illustrate the lock-in phenomenon: Imagine that
one share of stock in Company Pand one share of stock in Company Q are
both worth $1. An investor holds 100 shares of stock in Company P with
basis of $0.50 per share. The investor expects that Company Ps stock will
increase by 9.5% ($0.095) next year and that Company Us stock will increase by 10% ($0.10). Assume a tax rate of 20% on capital gains.

165.
We discuss the interaction between stepped-up basis and Chirelstein's proposal at
greater length in Section IIID. See infra Section IIID.
166.
The single-shareholder example is of course not an accurate description of the ownership structure of most publicly traded U.S. companies. Those companies will generally have a
broad range of shareholders, some of whom are tax-exempt institutions or non-U.S. residents. It
may be possible under current law for the corporation to buy back shares primarily or exclusively
from tax-exempts and foreigners, thereby avoiding any tax on distributions even before the death
of a founder and the resulting step-up in basis.
167.
One way in which Chirelstein's proposal might delay distributions is by making corporations into more attractive investment vehicles. Recall that under current law, corporations
can claim a 50% dividends-received deduction that reduces their effective tax rate on dividend
income to 10.5% (half the statutory rate of 21%). By treating all distributions as dividends rather
than capital gains, Chirelstein's proposal would make corporations more attractive vehicles for
holding equity investments (as corporations generally enjoy a tax advantage relative to individuals
with respect to dividends but not necessarily with respect to capital gains). This could cause corporations to retain more cash but to reinvest their earnings in other companies' stock rather than
in organic growth.
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Setting tax considerations aside, it is clear that the investor should sell
her 100 shares of Company Pand buy 100 shares of Company Q, since 100
shares of Q will be worth $110 while 100 shares of P will be worth only
$109.50. Tax changes the calculus. If the investor sells her stock in Ptoday,
she will owe capital gains tax of $10 (i.e., the amount realized of $100 minus
her basis of $50, multiplied by 20%). She will therefore be able to afford
only 90 shares of stock in Q. Those shares will increase in value to $99 a
year from now; if she sells those shares then, she will owe an additional
capital gains tax of $1.80; and she will be left with $97.20. By contrast, if the
investor holds onto her stock in P for another year and sells it then, her
amount realized will be $109.50; she will pay tax of $11.90; and she will be
left with $97.60. Because of tax considerations, the investor has an incentive to hold on to Company Ps stock. She is "locked in" to the lower-performing asset.

Table 7. Illustration of Lock-In Effect

Value at 1/1
Value at
12/31
Salespro-

Hold P
(no tax)
$100
$109.50

Sell P/Buy
Q (no tax)
$100
$110

Hold P
(20% tax)
$100
$109.50

Sell P/Buy Q
(20% tax)
$90
$99

$109.50

$110

$109.50

$99

$50
$59.50
N/A
$109.50

$100
$10
N/A
$110

$50
$59.50
$11.90
$97.60

$90
$9
$1.80
$97.20

ceeds

Stock basis
Gain
Tax due
After-tax
cash

The step-up in basis at death makes the lock-in problem worse in
some ways and better in others. Imagine that our hypothetical investor believes that she has only twelve more months to live. She can either hold on
to her stock in Company P, in which case her heirs will be able to sell the
stock tax-free upon her death, or she can reallocate from Pto Q, in which
case her heirs would be able to sell the stock in Q tax-free upon her death.
Now the incentive to hold on to Company Ps stock is even stronger. The
investor would prefer to leave her heirs 100 shares of stock in Pwith a value
of $109.50 rather than 90 shares of stock in Q with a value of $99. Indeed,
the investor would have an incentive to hold on to her shares of stock in P
even if she expected that the share price of Pwould decline (though by no
more than 1%) during the remainder of her life. Note, though, that
stepped-up basis can also reduce lock-in because after a person's death,
her heirs can rebalance inherited portfolios without worrying about tax on
unrealized gains.
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The welfare costs of lock-in are two-fold. First, lock-in may lead to the
misallocation of capital. That is, lock-in may deter investors from reallocating capital away from another lower-performing company and toward a
new, more efficient company or an existing company raising new capital
for promising projects. Second, lock-in may discourage investors from diversifying their portfolios and may lead them to bear excessive idiosyncratic risks. Imagine, for instance, that Investor Jholds 100 shares of stock
in Company P (worth $1 per share) and Investor K holds 100 shares of
stock in Company Q (worth $1 per share), and that neither investor has
any special knowledge as to the trajectory of either company's stock price.
Jand Kwould both be better off if Jtraded 50 shares of Pstock to Kfor
50 shares of stock in Q, because each would thereby diversify their portfolios and reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. But if the investors'
basis in their respective shares is low, they may be deterred by lock-in from
trading their shares. The upshot is that lock-in can stand in the way of what
would be-absent tax considerations -Pareto-efficient asset reallocations.
Lock-in arises from the difference between the fair market value of
an asset and a shareholder's basis in that asset: the larger the (positive)
difference, the larger the lock-in effect. Chirelstein's proposal mitigates the
lock-in problem by taxing all shareholders on their pro rata portion of corporate distributions and adjusting basis upwards when that happens. This
is a virtue of Chirelstein's approach. Yet importantly, Chirelstein's proposal does not eliminate lock-in-for two reasons. First, many companies
will continue to retain at least some earnings under Chirelstein's regime
(e.g., because they believe they can earn a higher after-tax rate of return
by reinvesting earnings inside the corporation than their shareholders can
earn outside). Earnings retention generally pushes fair market value above
basis. Second, fair market value will far exceed basis for shareholders in
many firms not because of earnings retention, but because of earnings expectations. An early investor in Facebook, for example, would still experience lock-in under Chirelstein's proposal-just to a slightly lesser extent.1 68
In short, we consider lock-in mitigation to be a benefit of Chirelstein's proposal but not an overwhelming argument for its adoption.1 69

168.
Facebook's authorized share repurchases since 2017 totaled $33 billion as of this
writing. See Patrick Thomas, Facebook Expands Share Buybacks, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2018, 6:25
PM
EST),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-expands-share-buybacks-1544225152
[https://perma.cc/U6RN-8HDF]. Under Chirelstein's proposal, a shareholder who bought Facebook stock for $38 per share at its initial public offering in May 2012 would have a basis of about

$49 (i.e., $33 billion divided by roughly 3 billion shares equals $11 per share plus $38). Facebook
was trading at slightly more than $254 per share as of this writing. See Facebook, Inc., YAHOO
FIN. (Sept. 25, 2020, 4:00 PM EST), https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FB [https://perma.cc/NDA6-

SQQ9].
169.
The EED proposal to neutralize the direct tax consequences between redemptions
and dividends, previously discussed, see supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text, would
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D. Buybacks and the Mark ZuckerbergProblem

'

One of the most significant benefits of Chirelstein's proposal is that it
would reduce the Mark Zuckerberg problem noted earlier. Current law
allows founders of successful companies to amass tremendous fortunes
without paying any income tax on those gains by acquiring founder's stock
and then holding that stock until they die. Because of the stepped-up basis
rule, the founder's heirs can then sell the shares without any income tax
due.1 70 During the founder's life, the corporation can distribute earnings to
shareholders via buybacks, and the founders will face no tax liability as
long as they do not redeem their shares. When she desires liquidity, the
founder can borrow against her stockholdings and extend the terms of
those loans indefinitely. Zuckerberg, for example, should not face too
much trouble in finding a financial institution that will lend him all he could
need for his lifetime consumption secured by his $60 billion of Facebook
stock. Moreover, the loan plus accrued interest will be a liability of the
founder's estate, meaning that it will reduce estate tax when the founder
dies. As Edward J. McCaffery writes, "the wealthy ... can literally live a
tax-free life using Buy/Borrow/Die."' 7
The ability of founders to avoid tax through "Buy/Borrow/Die" is
problematic from virtually any normative perspective. Founder income
largely represents a return to entrepreneurial labor, not a return to capital
investment. In the Facebook case, for example, Zuckerberg's own capital
contributions to the company were trivial. While some commentators have
argued that the optimal tax on capital income is zero (and, indeed, a long
literature in public finance theory supports that conclusion1 72), nearly everyone agrees that labor income should be taxed. Although "Buy/Borrow/Die" is arguably the product of a number of individually defensible
policy choices, the ultimate outcome is exceedingly difficult to justify.
The most straightforward way to address "Buy/Borrow/Die" is to repeal section 1014, the code provision that allows for stepped-up basis at
death.1 7 3 We agree with that prescription, and Chirelstein did too.1 74 However, stepped-up basis has been repealed twice before and replaced with

exacerbate rather than ameliorate the lock-in effect because it would reduce rather than increase
stock basis whenever earnings are distributed. See Yale, supra note 19, at 361.

170.
171.

See I.R.C. § 1014 (2018).
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, 70 TAx L. REV. 305, 321 (2017).

172.
173.

See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 29.
See Richard Schmalbeck, Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Advocating

a CarryoverTax Basis Regime, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109,110-11 (2017); Jay A. Soled, Richard A. Schmalbeck & James Alm, Reassessingthe Costs of the Stepped-Up Basis Rule, 162 TAX
NOTES 769,774 (2019).
174.

MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A GUIDE TO THE

LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 62 (7th ed. 1994) ("No convincing rationale for the death-basis
rule has ever been offered .... ").
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carryover basis, and in both cases, Congress "repealed the repeal."'7 5
Mounting concerns about widening wealth inequality might cause steppedup basis repeal to "stick" this time, but if the past is prologue, then repeal
of section 1014 will not solve the Mark Zuckerberg problem provided that
Zuckerberg outlives the repeal. Moreover, since most of the revenues from
stepped-up basis repeal would be far in the future, the ten-year revenue
estimate for replacing stepped-up basis with carryover basis is relatively
low (about $105 billion over a decade, according to the Congressional
Budget Office).' 7 6 Chirelstein's proposal, by contrast, would begin to raise
revenue from high-net-worth founders such as Zuckerberg as soon as their
companies begin distributing cash.17 7 Whether or not revenue falls within
the 10-year window has no obvious policy significance, but it does have
political significance due to Congress's inordinate emphasis on 10-year revenue projections.
None of this is to suggest that Chirelstein's proposal is a substitute for
stepped-up basis repeal-rather, the two policies are complementary.
Moreover, leaving stepped-up basis in place while implementing the
Chirelstein regime could detract from the efficacy of Chirelstein's proposal. To illustrate: imagine that a founder who acquired stock for $0 dies
when shares are worth $100. Upon the founder's death, her heirs' basis is
stepped up to $100. If the corporation then initiated a buyback that resulted in an imputed dividend of $10 per share, the heirs would be taxed
on the distribution but would now have basis of $110 per share. If the heirs
redeemed their shares in the buyback or sold their stock immediately
thereafter, they would have a capital loss of $10 per share. If the heirs had
net long-term capital gains that could soak up the capital loss, then the
overall tax impact of the buyback would be neutral: the heirs would pay
tax on an imputed dividend of $10 (versus zero under current law) but
would recapture that tax when they deduct their capital loss. If the heirs
had net short-term capital gains but not net long-term capital gains in their
basket, then they would actually win from Chirelstein's proposal, since the
tax on the imputed dividend (23.8% x $10 per share = $2.38, assuming that
they are in the top bracket) would be less than the value of the capital loss
(40.8% x $10 per share = $4.08).

175.

McCaffery, supra note 171, at 320 (discussing the fate of stepped-up basis repeal

provisions in 1980 and 2001 legislation).
176.
See OptionsforReducing the Deficit:2019 to 2028, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 219 (Dec.
2018),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-06/54667-budgetoptions-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8L9N-7LHL].
177.
The EED proposal to neutralize the direct tax consequences between dividends and
redemptions would not have this salutary effect because the EED tax would have no impact on
nonredeemers. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. Thus, as under current law, the
Zuckerbergs of the world can simply choose to not redeem and avoid the EED tax, whereas under
the Chirelstein proposal they would be taxed whenever the corporation buys back stock from any
shareholders.
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Table 8. Illustration of Interaction Between Chirelstein Proposal and
Stepped-Up Basis Rule
Value of shares
Redemption effect
Redemption tax
Basis afterredemption
Salesproceeds
Loss on sale
Tax benefit of loss if offsets net
long-term capitalgain
Tax benefit of loss if offsets net
short-term capitalgain
Net tax consequence if offsets

Current law
$100
N/A
$0
$100
$100
$0
$0

Chirelstein Proposal
$100
$10 dividend
$2.38
$110
$100
($10)
$2.38

$0

$4.08

$0

$0

$0

$1.70 tax reduction

net long-term capitalgain

Net tax consequence if offsets
net short-term capitalgain

Nevertheless, in practice we expect that Chirelstein's proposal still
would raise significant revenue from founders and their heirs even if the
stepped-up basis rule is retained or resurrected. Under current law, a
founder's heirs can replicate the results of "Buy/Borrow/Die" through "Inherit/Borrow/Die": they avoid realizing any gains during their lifetimes,
borrow against appreciated stock for liquidity, and repay loans only after
death and basis step-up. If capital gains taxes are essentially irrelevant to
heirs, then the fact that Chirelstein's proposal reduces capital gains taxes
on heirs (but not below zero1 7 8) is essentially irrelevant too. In sum, Chirelstein's proposal is likely to mitigate the Mark Zuckerberg problem even if
stepped-up basis remains, and if stepped-up basis is repealed permanently,
Chirelstein's proposal still would serve the salutary purpose of alleviating
(though not eliminating) lock-in.
E. Buybacks and the PanamaPapersProblem
Chirelstein's proposal further serves to address what we previously
termed "the Panama Papers problem." Because current law exempts capital gains, but not dividends, realized by foreign holders of U.S. stock, highnet-worth individuals from around the world can accumulate significant
gains from U.S. equity investments without paying any tax anywhere. They
do this by purchasing publicly traded U.S. stocks that pay zero or low

178.
Recall that capital losses can offset only capital gains and up to $3,000 of ordinary
income. See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2018). Losses are in this sense "nonrefundable": a capital loss can
be carried forward indefinitely, but without taxable income to offset, it is essentially worthless.
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dividends through entities in tax haven jurisdictions. As a result, zero- or
low-dividend-yield U.S. stocks offer an attractive place for tax dodgers to
park their cash.
The magnitude of the Panama Papers problem is staggering. Economist Gabriel Zucman has estimated that individuals and firms in tax havens
held 9% of all U.S.-listed equities as of 2013.179 If that percentage holds
today over a total of $40.6 trillion in U.S. equity issuances, it would mean
that more than $3.65 trillion in U.S. equities lie in the hands of tax haven
investors.1 80 One can argue with Zucman's figures at the margins (for example, his definition of tax havens is certainly contestable 81 ), but it is difficult to disbelieve the fact that a significant slice of U.S. equities are held
by investors in very low-tax jurisdictions -often out of sight of authorities
in investors' home countries. When U.S.-listed corporations distribute cash
to shareholders via buybacks, they effectively allow tax haven investors to
earn returns tax-free.
Chirelstein's proposal would close this opportunity by extending the
withholding tax to all cash distributions-dividends as well as buybacks.
High-net-worth individuals still might (and indeed, likely would) use offshore entities to avoid home country tax authorities, but they would have
to pay U.S. tax if they wanted to park their hidden wealth in U.S. equities.18 2 The near-term revenue gain would be substantial: assuming a 30%
withholding rate, a 2.5% buyback rate,'18 3 and $3.65 trillion of tax haven

equity investments, the revenue gain from tax haven investors alone would
be in the range of $27 billion per year. Again, there is no indication that
Chirelstein-writing before the rise of tax-haven investing-anticipated
this benefit. This is one more way in which Chirelstein's proposal has found
a new justification in its later life.
Importantly, our estimate of revenue gains from tax-haven investors
assumes that implementation of Chirelstein's proposal does not affect the
share of U.S. equities held in tax havens. It is possible that tax-haven investors, faced with higher effective tax rates under Chirelstein's proposal,

179.

Gabriel Zucman, TaxingAcross Borders: TrackingPersonalWealth andCorporate

Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 137 (2014).
180.

See Rosenthal & Burke, supra note 68, at 14 (reporting U.S. equity issuances of

$40.581 trillion in 2019).
181.
See, e.g., Conor Clarke, What Are Tax Havens and Why Are They Bad? 95 TEX.
L. REV. 59,67-68 (2016) (reviewing GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OFNATIONS: THE
SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS (2015)).
182.
On the role of onshore financial centers such as the United States in facilitating
offshore tax evasion, see Daniel Hemel, What's the Matter with Luxembourg? NEW RAMBLER
REV. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/economics/what-s-the-matterwith-luxembourg [https://perma.cc/DM22-YVGZ], which reviews ZUCMAN, supra note 181.
183.
See Edward Yardeni, Joe Abbott & Mali Quintana, CorporateFinance Briefing:
S&P 500 Buybacks & Dividends, YADENI RES., INC. 9 fig.10 (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.yardeni.com/pub/bbdivepsyield.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2LK-E8XV].
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would reallocate their portfolios toward other markets. In that case, our
back-of-the-envelope estimate of revenue raised from tax-haven investors
would be an overestimate. This caveat, though, comes with two qualifications of its own. First, we know very little about the price elasticity of demand for U.S. equities among tax-haven investors. It may be that the relative safety and strong performance of U.S. equities over time induces taxhaven investors to retain U.S. stocks even when the tax advantages decline.
Second, U.S. stocks constitute more than half of the global equity market.1 84 Investors interested in diversification therefore may decide to retain
U.S. equities notwithstanding tax disadvantages because diversification
benefits outweigh tax costs.
Chirelstein's proposal-unlike several other changes to capital taxation such as the repeal of stepped-up basis or a move to a mark-to-market
system-also would raise revenue from foreign investors in non-tax-haven
jurisdictions in the near term.1 85 Tax treaties generally allow the United
States to tax foreign residents on dividends from U.S. corporations but not
on capital gains from the sale of U.S. companies' stock.1 86 "Dividends" are
defined to include income that is taxed like a dividend when received by a
U.S. resident.1 87 By treating buybacks as dividends with respect to U.S. residents, the United States would likely gain the right to treat buybacks as
dividends with respect to foreign resident shareholders (and to tax them
accordingly). By contrast, the United States almost certainly would not be
able-under existing tax treaties-to extend mark-to-market treatment to
foreign shareholders or to tax foreigners on capital gains at death.1 88
The application of Chirelstein's proposal to foreign investors in nontax-haven jurisdictions is normatively more complicated than its application to tax-haven holdings. In many cases, the investors themselves would
be unaffected by the change because their home-country government
would give them a dollar-for-dollar credit equal to the tax that they paid to

184.

See Brian J. Scott, Kimberly Stockton & Scott J. Donaldson, GlobalEquityInvestRES. 2 (Feb. 2019),

ing: The Benefits of Diversificationand Sizing Your Allocation, VANGUARD

https://www.vanguard.com/pdf/ISGGEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/22XV-2ZTB] (estimating that U.S.
equities accounted for 55.1% of the global equity market in 2018).
185.
The Andrews corporate excise tax and Yin corporate distribution tax proposals discussed above, see supra note 130, would have this feature too. Both proposals would effectively
impose a U.S. tax on stock repurchases even when those repurchases were from foreign shareholders.
186.
See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, 1 Tax
Treaties (CCH) ¶ 209.10, art. 10(1) (2020) (allowing the taxation of foreign residents on dividends); id. art. 13(6) (limiting the taxation of foreign residents on capital gains).
187.
See id. art. 10(5) (defining "dividends" to include any "income that is subjected to
the same taxation treatment as income from shares under the laws of the State of which the payer
is a resident").

188.
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the United States.1 89 The near-term revenue gain to the United States
would be substantial though: based on data suggesting that approximately
40% of U.S. equities are held by foreigners, subtracting out the 9% in tax
havens, assuming a 15% withholding rate, and again projecting a buyback
rate of 2.5% over a total of $40.6 trillion in U.S. equity issuances, we estimate a revenue gain of approximately $47 billon per year. 90 The net effect
would be a redistribution of wealth from the home country government to
the U.S. government rather than a change in the total amount of tax that
the investor pays. Whether the United States should be in the business of
siphoning off revenue from its overseas trading partners is a question that
we bracket for the time being.191 If this outcome is objectionable, the
United States can-at least in theory-neutralize it through governmentto-government transfers. The efficacy of a strategy aimed at shifting revenue from foreign governments to the United States also is open to question: foreign governments ultimately may respond by adopting versions of
Chirelstein's proposal themselves, thereby raising revenue from U.S. residents who hold foreign equities. The more easily defensible claim, we
think, is that the United States ought to ensure that high-net-worth individuals who hide wealth in tax haven jurisdictions should pay some tax on
their U.S. equity gains. Chirelstein's proposal-while not designed to increase the effective tax rate on tax-haven holders of U.S. stock-would
likely have that salubrious effect.1 92
IV. Beyond Buybacks
Our analysis so far has evaluated Chirelstein's proposal as a piecemeal
reform of the federal income-tax system that leaves other elements in
place. Chirelstein's proposal provides a partial solution to the Mark Zuckerberg problem (the effective nontaxation of the labor income of firm

189.

See Guide to Going Global: Tax-FullHandbook, DLA PIPER 249 (Sept. 28, 2020),

https://www.dlapiperintelligence.com/goingglobal/tax/handbook.pdf

[https://perma.cc/LL

U3-N5JE].
190.
The 15% withholding rate is based on tax treaties. The overall estimate of a $74
billion per year revenue effect ($27 billion from foreigners in tax haven jurisdictions plus $47 billion from foreigners in non-tax-haven jurisdictions), see supra note 25 and accompanying text,
assumes (very conservatively) that gains from mitigating the Mark Zuckerberg problem offset
losses from the reduced rate on dividends received by C corporations in buybacks.
191.
On the role of national interest in U.S. tax policy, see Michael J. Graetz, The Da vid
R. TillinghastLecture: Taxing InternationalIncome: InadequatePrinciples, OutdatedConcepts,
and UnsatisfactoryPolicy, 54 TAx L. REV. 261 (2001), which discusses the interplay between geopolitical developments and international income taxation.
192.
The EED proposal to neutralize the direct tax consequences between dividends and
redemptions, see supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text, would not have this effect because
under that proposal, (i) redeemers are still treated as recognizing capital gains, and (ii) nonredeemers are unaffected. In fact, the EED proposal could, depending on the technical details of its
implementation, exacerbate the Panama Papers problem because it might treat all transactions
that are dividends under current law as constructive sales yielding capital gains, which are exempt
from U.S. tax when recognized by foreigners.
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founders) and a partial solution to the Panama Papers problem (the use of
U.S. equity markets by tax-haven investors to generate tax-free returns).
No one would argue, though, that Chirelstein's proposal fixes all of the
federal income-tax system's flaws-or even all of the flaws in the status quo
treatment of equity returns. In this Part, we consider potential interactions
between Chirelstein's proposal and more sweeping reforms. We conclude
by reflecting on the limits and merits of incrementalism in tax policy and
tax law scholarship.
A. Buybacks andRate Equalization
One oft-discussed reform to capital taxation is rate equalization: an
end to the preferential rate for long-term capital gains and qualified dividends. All of the leading 2020 Democratic presidential candidates -including Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren, Amy
Klobuchar, and Mike Bloomberg-said they would tax capital gains and
dividends at the same rate as ordinary income, at least for the highest income households. 9 3 Chirelstein's proposal would be complementary-and
indeed, integral-to such a shift.
Proposals to tax qualified dividends and long-term capital gains at the
same rate as ordinary income have obvious appeal in an era of wide wealth
inequality. In 2016, according to IRS data, long-term capital gains and
qualified dividends taxed at preferential rates accounted for 3% of all income reported by taxpayers in the bottom 95% of the income distribution,
rising to 71% for taxpayers in the top 0.001% of the income distribution.1 94
Ordinary investors tend to hold all or most of their stock in tax-preferred
accounts, such as IRAs and 401(k)s, and therefore would be largely unaffected by a capital gains increase. Increasing the capital gains rate therefore
seems like a well-targeted tax increase on the well-to-do, and the current
capital gains rate preference of 17% appears to be awfully ripe for the picking.
This analysis, however, neglects to consider behavioral responses by
taxpayers to a significant increase in the capital gains rate. As noted above,

193.
See, e.g., Brian Faler, Bloomberg Targets the Rich with His Tax Plan, but More
Gently than Some of His Rivals, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2020, 12:30 PM EST), https://www.polit-

ico.com/news/2020/02/01/michael-bloomberg-tax-plan-110105

[https://perma.cc/XY86-];

Capital

Gains Taxes, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-viewson-the-issues/tax-reform/capital-gains-taxes [https://perma.cc/GC5J-V8RF] (outlining the 2020
Democratic Party presidential candidates' positions on capital gains taxes).
194.
See Lily Batchelder & David Kamin, Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options 4 tbl.1
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452274 [https://perma.cc/JP8P-49TD] (working paper). For taxpayers in the 96th through 99th percentiles, long-term capital gains and qualified dividends accounted for 9% of reported income; for taxpayers in the top percentile but outside the
top tenth of a percentile, 17%; and for taxpayers in the top tenth of a percentile but outside the
top 0.001% of the income distribution, 39%. Id
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capital gains are currently imposed only upon a realization event, such as
a sale. In addition, capital losses recognized on the sale of depreciated assets can be used to offset capital gains recognized on the sale of appreciated
assets. This means that selective realizations can be used to avoid paying
current capital gains tax. Stepped-up basis at death exacerbates this problem, but even if that were eliminated, taxpayers could substantially reduce
the effective tax rate on equity returns by delaying realization and deferring tax.1 95
Raising the tax rate on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends
without changing other features of federal income-tax law would thus have
relatively muted revenue effects. The Penn Wharton Budget Model predicts that the revenue-maximizing tax rate on capital gains under current
law is approximately 33%; rate increases beyond that threshold would not
raise additional revenue and ultimately would reduce revenue.19 6 The revenue-maximizing rate would be higher-approximately 42%, according to
the Penn Wharton Budget Model's estimates-if stepped-up basis at death
were eliminated and death were treated as a realization event.19 7 Notably,
though, the 42% figure is still below the top tax rate on capital gains proposed by the leading 2020 Democratic contenders.1 98 Chirelstein's proposal
would likely push that revenue-maximizing rate higher than 42%, as investors could no longer avoid tax during their lifetimes by purchasing stock in
companies that return earnings to shareholders via buybacks rather than
dividends. And the harder it is to avoid a tax, the higher the revenue-maximizing rate.
B. Buybacks andan End to Realization
A more substantial reform to capital taxation than simply increasing
the statutory rate would be to end the realization requirement altogether.
One such proposal is for mark-to-market taxation: for assets that taxpayers

195.
To illustrate: imagine that the return on equity capital is 10% per year and the tax
rate is 40%. After 10 years, an investment of $100 would be worth $259.37, and if realized, would

produce a tax liability of 40% x ($259.37-$100)

=

$63.75, resulting in $195.62 after taxes. That is

the equivalent of a 6.94% after-tax return, substantially above the 6% return that would be produced by applying the 40% tax to the 10% pre-tax return each year.
196.
See John Ricco, The Revenue-Maximizing CapitalGains TaxRate: With and Without Stepped-upBasis atDeath, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL (Dec. 4, 2019), https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2019/12/4/the-revenue-maximizing-capital-gains-tax-rate-withand-without-stepped-up-basis-at-death [https://perma.cc/5EM7-SEB3].

197.

Id

198.
The top capital gains rate (including a net-investment income tax) would be at least
43.4% under plans proposed by Pete Buttigieg and Joe Biden, at least 55.8% under Sanders's plan,
and 58.2% under Warren's proposal. See Erin Arvedlund, Democratic Candidates'Proposed
Wealth, Income Taxes: Who Has the Lowest andHighest Tax Plan? PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 3,
2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/business/2020-election-trump-warren-sanders-biden-capitalgains-taxes-wealth-tax-20200203.html [https://perma.cc/L8TE-RWKB].
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hold year-to-year, taxpayers would owe tax each year on any increase in
value from January 1 to December 31.199 Results similar to mark-to-market
taxation could be achieved by delaying the assessment of tax until realization but imposing a surcharge designed to negate any tax benefit from deferral-a proposal known as "retrospective capital gains taxation."200 In a
mark-to-market world, domestic taxable investors would be essentially indifferent between buybacks and dividends, because any year-to-year increase in a stock's value would be taxed in full. Thus, for purposes of domestic taxation, Chirelstein's proposal and mark-to-market taxation are
substitutes rather than complements.
As noted above, though, the analysis changes significantly once foreign investors enter the picture. Because tax treaties generally allow the
United States to tax U.S.-source dividends but bar the United States from
taxing foreign investors on capital gains (while following home-country
definitions of dividends and capital gains), 201 mark-to-market taxation of

capital gains would raise little revenue from non-U.S. investors. Reclassifying buybacks as dividends, by contrast, would bring foreign shareholders
of zero-dividend U.S. corporations within reach of the U.S. tax system.
Once again, this outcome raises difficult normative questions, 202 but it is far
from duplicative of mark-to-market taxation.
C Buybacks and Tax Incrementalism
Chirelstein's proposal would still leave gaps in the United States's
capital taxation regime. Founders of firms that retain earnings rather than
distributing cash to shareholders via buybacks or dividends still could avoid
taxation on what is essentially labor income for their whole lives. Tax haven investors would be subject to U.S. tax whenever firms in which they
own equity repurchase shares, but they still could earn tax-free returns on
investments in U.S. corporate debt.2 03 Other well-acknowledged flaws in
the U.S. system of capital taxation-such as the nontaxation of life insurance buildup 204-would linger as well.
The Chirelstein proposal is thus an incremental reform rather than a
structural overhaul. Our endorsement of the Chirelstein proposal should
not be understood to imply that reform ought to proceed incrementally.

199.

For an overview of mark-to-market income taxation, see Daniel Hemel, Taxing

Wealth in an Uncertain World, 72 NAT'L TAX J. 755, 757-58 (2019).
200.
Id at 758-59 (defining retrospective capital gains tax and differentiating it from an
annual wealth tax and mark-to-market income tax). The idea of a retrospective capital gains tax
emerged from the work of economist Alan Auerbach, who also coined the term. See Auerbach,
supra note 22.
201.
See supra notes 185-188 and accompanying text.
202.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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See I.R.C.

204.

See Johnson, Pike & Lustig, supra note 23, at 665.

(2018) (portfolio interest exemption).

Taxing Buybacks
At the same time, there is a danger in thinking exclusively in terms of structural overhaul: it may leave us unprepared to identify and capitalize upon
windows for incremental improvements. In an era of often-divided government, opportunities for incremental reform are likely to be relatively more
frequent (though still absolutely rare) than opportunities for vast structural
change to the tax system. Chirelstein's buyback proposal-because of its
bipartisan appeal-may exert a special attraction. Focusing intentlythough not exclusively-on incremental reforms such as Chirelstein's buyback proposal can put us in a better position to seize the day when chances
for smaller-scope changes present themselves.
There is another respect in which our endorsement of the Chirelstein's proposal is incrementalist. This Article innovates upon Chirelstein's
50-year-old framework rather than charting an entirely new course for the
taxation of buybacks. Our innovations are, we believe, real improvements
on the original. We think, for example, that our proposed basis-adjustment
method and our 43-cents-on-the-dollar rule would make Chirelstein's proposal more straightforward from an administrative and compliance perspective. And-most importantly-the connections we draw between
Chirelstein's proposal and the Mark Zuckerberg and Panama Papers problems give normative force to a proposal that was previously long on elegance and short on justification. All the while, we recognize-and emphasize-that we are standing on the shoulders of a giant.
Incrementalism of this variety has a different sort of value. The fascination with novelty and the fear of preemption in tax-law academia encourage authors to seek out new ideas where old ideas might suit well or
better. Chirelstein's proposal is, we have argued, an ingenious idea that
arrived before its time. The intellectual hypothesis motivating our Article
is that often (though certainly not always) the best ideas were already
thought, and that much progress can be made by plumbing tax law scholarship's past. The proof of this proposition is ultimately in the pudding, and
Chirelstein's proposal is-we think-one data point in its favor.
Conclusion
Marvin Chirelstein's half-century-old proposal to tax buybacks as dividends has garnered relatively little attention from tax law academics despite the irrefutable economic similarity between the two transactions and
the technical elegance of Chirelstein's solution. Nevertheless, after passing
its fiftieth anniversary, the proposal is due for a new life-though for different reasons than those cited by Chirelstein. While parity for parity's
sake is not an altogether convincing argument, the Chirelstein proposal
would mitigate fundamental problems that currently plague the federal income system. Given the explosive growth of buybacks and the bipartisan
antipathy towards them, the Chirelstein proposal also has the virtue of being politically realistic in an era when partisan polarization potentially puts
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more sweeping reforms out of reach. Chirelstein's proposal was an idea
ahead of its time. More than fifty years later, time has finally caught up.
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